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 ABSTRACT 
School Closure in New York City 
Megan Silander 
School districts and states have increasingly abandoned traditional school reform efforts in favor 
of simply closing low-performing schools. This movement reflects growing frustration among 
policymakers with the disappointing effects of previous school improvement policies, and the 
view that some schools may simply lack the capacity to undertake meaningful improvements. 
This paper focuses on arguably the most aggressive school closure policies in the nation—those 
in New York City. Over the past decade, New York City has closed over 100 schools. Using a 
longitudinal database of students and schools, I explore the implementation and effects of closure 
and reconstitution of middle schools in New York City, and assess the links between 
school closure and student academic development and behavior.   
My descriptive findings indicate that schools selected for closure have significantly lower 
school-average state test score exams and lower attendance rates compared to other middle 
schools for several years prior to closure, and that students who attend these schools are almost 
exclusively Hispanic and Black, more likely to come from low-income families, and more 
mobile than other middle school students in the district. I also find that students enter these 
middle schools already at a significant academic disadvantage.  I examine characteristics of the 
reconstituted schools that replace the closed schools, and find that in terms of demographics, 
reconstituted schools enroll students similar to those served by the closed schools that they 
replaced. However, the reconstituted schools serve higher performing students with fewer 
absences and tardies in the year prior to enrolling in middle school.  
 To assess the impact of school closure on student academic outcomes, I use propensity-
score matching within a difference-in-differences framework. I find a small, positive effect of 
school closure on student test scores and rates of absences. As a robustness check, I conduct a 
second set of analyses using student fixed-effects models that produced similar results: students 
learn slightly less at chronically underperforming schools, compared to what would have 
happened had they attended an alternate school.   
School closure appears to be a somewhat effective in improving student academic 
outcomes. It is not clear, however, whether the policy is efficient given the small effects and the 
considerable disruption associated with the policy. Future research should examine the fiscal 
costs associated with closure, compared to costs of other policies with similar effects. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
Introduction 
Over the past ten years, the New York City Department of Education has closed and 
reconstituted over 100 schools, and the pace of school closures is accelerating.  In Spring 2012, 
the Department announced that it would close 42 schools the following school year alone.  In 
support of the school closures, district administrators have cited chronically low test scores and 
graduation rates, as well as the necessity to demonstrate the very real consequences of the 
district’s accountability system (Otterman, 2011).  Mayor Bloomberg—a strong supporter of 
non-traditional approaches to school reform—has commented that those protesting the closures 
were either captives of nostalgia or were more concerned about jobs for teachers than the 
education of students attending poor-quality schools (Hernandez, 2011).  Parents, students, 
teachers, alumni and local officials responded with heated anger and loud protests at the 
District’s public school closure hearings (Otterman, 2011), and requested more academic and 
fiscal support to resurrect the schools that had served as the center of their communities, in some 
cases for decades (Robinson, 2010).  Others argued that the fact that many of the schools slated 
for closure had been created under the existing Bloomberg administration suggested that the new 
closures and reconstitutions are unlikely to be any more successful (Rondinone, 2010).  In spite 
of the controversy, District administrators have not wavered from the closure plans.  
Opponents to the District’s actions have charged that school closures are too costly and 
come at the expense of additional resources for struggling students (United Federation of 
Teachers, 2009); that school closure selection criteria are subjective and reflect political 
favoritism (Hernandez, 2009; Otterman, 2010c); that the reform is racist in its targeting of 
schools that enroll mainly Black and Hispanic students (Cramer, 2008a; Somerville, 2011); that 
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 it does not take into account the additional needs and supports of the disproportionately 
disadvantaged students these schools currently serve (Somerville, 2011); that the reform is top-
down and does not reflect the desires of local communities and families; that the measure is 
punitive rather than rehabilitative (Otterman, 2010a); and that it accelerates already substantial 
neighborhood gentrification, thus marginalizing such communities even further (Cramer, 2008b).  
The District, however, counters that school closures represent the only means to dislodge 
elements of a moribund system entrenched within a failing bureaucracy (Hernandez, 2009).  At 
the center of arguments supporting school closures is the contention that school closure results in 
improved student achievement.  The dissertation examines the accuracy of this assertion within 
the context of New York City.   
2
 National Policy Context 
Dozens of districts and states nationwide have implemented accountability policies that 
focus on school closures, including Chicago, which has closed 22 schools over the past ten years 
for poor academic performance (de la Torre & Gwynne, 2009) and Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 
which recently decided to close ten of its 178 schools (Helms & Price, 2010).  Rhode Island 
(Kaye, 2010) and Kentucky (Maxwell, 2010) have also received national attention for their 
school closure efforts.  But New York City is arguably the epicenter for this fundamentally 
different approach to education reform.  
The shift from traditional school reforms toward more dramatic approaches is partly a 
response to policies initiated by the U.S. Department of Education.  The federal Race to the Top 
(RttT) and School Improvement Grants (SIGs) competitions were designed to encourage states to 
take more forceful approaches to improving chronically low-performing schools (Otterman, 
2010a).  Three of the four federal policy options focus on school closure and reconstitution, and 
include closing a school entirely (“school closure”); replacing the principal and at least half the 
staff (“turnaround model”); closing and reopening a school as a charter school or under an 
educational management organization (the “restart model”); and replacing the principal while 
providing strategic school reform supports (the “transformational model;” US Department of 
Education [USDOE], 2010a; 2009).  A recent analysis of the implementation of SIGs for the first 
and second cohorts of schools—in 2010 and 2011—suggests that although most schools are 
carrying out the school transformation model, another one-fifth of the 1,355 SIG-awarded 
schools are implementing the turnaround reform model, which most closely replicates closure 
and reconstitution (USGAO, 2012).  In contrast, results from a survey of a nationally 
representative sample of school districts one year prior to the SIG program indicated that just 
3
 over ten percent had implemented a version of the federal turnaround reform model (Center on 
Education Policy, 2010), suggesting that the implementation of school closure and reconstitution 
has grown substantially over the past few years. 
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) also includes a series of incentives and sanctions 
for low-performing schools; the ultimate set of sanctions focuses on school “restructuring,” 
under which school closure and reconstitution is an option (USDOE, 2008).  Furthermore, the 
Obama Administration’s Blueprint for re-authorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act proposes to continue this approach to school turnaround.  Under the Blueprint, 
states must implement one of the four reform models for the bottom five percent of low-
performing schools in each state (USDOE, 2010b).  
In addition to these Federal mandates and guidelines, the budget deficits facing many 
districts and states have intensified school closure efforts.  School districts, particularly those 
located in cities experiencing economic decline, increasingly are coupling school closure with 
fiscal considerations (Rich, 2012), including those in Boston (Kandile, 2011), Cleveland (Rich, 
2012); Columbus (Rich, 2012), Detroit (Dawsey, 2012), Kansas City (Robertson, 2010), 
Oakland (Tucker, 2012), Providence (Beale, 2011), San Diego (Carless, 2012), South Bend 
(Kilbride, 2012) and Tucson (Wallace, 2011).  Secretary Duncan has publicly encouraged state 
governors to consider closing low-performing schools as one method to simultaneously close 
achievement gaps and budget gaps (USDOE, 2011).  Importantly, in these instances, school 
closures are justified in part by declining enrollment and new schools are not opened to replace 
the closed schools.  In contrast, New York City is not obligated to close schools because of 
declining enrollments, which have remained relatively stable over the past decade.  Raising 
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 student achievement is the only justification for closing the city’s schools, making clarification 
of the impact of the policy on student achievement an even greater imperative. 
School Closure and Reconstitution: Theory of Action 
Closure as Threat 
The growing national reliance on school closure, along with the controversies that often 
follow its implementation, call for a closer examination of the theories on which the policy rests.  
Supporters of school closure and reconstitution claim two theoretical benefits.  First, the threat of 
reconstitution can serve as a source of motivation, encouraging school staff to work harder with 
the hope of avoiding closure.  Indeed, increasing the pressure on all schools to improve student 
achievement is a central aim of the policy.  Thus, implementation of school closure as a policy 
remedy of last resort might be essential to maintain the integrity of local accountability systems.  
Regardless of whether school closure is effective for school buildings that are closed, school 
closure arguably increases the effectiveness of the accountability system by demonstrating that 
the sanctions within the system are indeed a threat, thereby motivating other similarly struggling 
schools.  This sentiment is reflected in comments the Secretary of Education made in September, 
2010 on Face the Nation:  “You have to couple that autonomy with real accountability.  And you 
have to hold them accountable for results.  And we have five-year performance contracts.  I ran 
the Chicago public schools.  I was lucky to start many successful charter schools, but I closed 
three for academic failure.  And so you have to couple that autonomy with real accountability.” 
However, research on the relationship between accountability threats and student 
achievement is inconclusive.  Findings on the impact of high-stakes testing and accountability 
systems suggest that these types of incentive and sanction schemes provide no consistent positive 
effects on student learning.  Several studies of the impact of accountability policies have found 
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 no impact on student achievement in Charlotte-Mecklenberg (Smith & Mickelson, 2000) and 
Dallas (Ladd, 1999) mixed results in Chicago (Jacob, 2005; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2008). Other 
studies that examined multiple states found positive impacts on student achievement on high-
stakes exams, particularly for those students already close to passing (Ballou & Springer, 2009) 
and positive impacts on low-stakes exams for all students, not just those close to passing 
(Reback, Rockoff & Schwartz, 2011).  As these differential impacts suggest, some evidence 
indicates that high-stakes accountability systems caused schools to game the system.  
Specifically, schools focus their efforts on those students who are on the margin of passing and 
thus would make the greatest contribution to the accountability rating, so that the lowest-
achieving students evidence lower or no learning gains on average (Burgess et al., 2005; Neal & 
Schanzenbach, 2008; Reback, 2008). 
Little research examines the threat of sanctions specifically; evidence that disentangles 
accountability threats from stigma and incentives suggests no clear impact of accountability 
system threats on student achievement.  Findings from a study of the NYC accountability 
system, in which schools that receive the lowest accountability ratings face possible removal of 
the school administration or closure and reconstitution, suggests that these threats result in 
improved student achievement.  Students in schools that received the lowest accountability 
grades earned higher mathematics and English scores in the following year, compared to similar 
students in schools with very slightly higher accountability ratings, suggesting that accountability 
threats caused an increase in student learning (Rockoff & Turner, 2008).  However, the study did 
not disentangle the impact of stigma from threat of closure or leadership removal.  A related 
study in Florida found no impacts of accountability threats similar to closure, such as the threat 
of voucher assignment, on student achievement in English, and small positive impacts on 
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 mathematics achievement, but only for students in the high-stakes grades being tested. 
Moreover, the results indicated that these gains were due to the stigma of the low accountability 
grade rather than the threat of vouchers (Figlio & Rouse, 2005).  Similarly, examination of North 
Carolina’s school-level NCLB accountability sanctions found no effect of the threat of a 
sanction, nor of the sanction itself (Ahn & Vigdor, 2009).  
Benefits of Reconstitution 
In addition to the use of closure to maintain the integrity of the accountability system, 
benefits may also flow from reconstitution itself, as new, supposedly more talented staff 
implement more effective pedagogical methods (Hess, 2003; Rice & Malen, 2003).  School 
closure policies operate on the basic assumption that some schools simply lack the capacity to 
improve, a notion supported in part by the fact that schools are typically closed only after several 
years of mandated and ultimately unsuccessful reform efforts.  This perspective represents a 
dramatic shift away from traditional conceptions of school reform, in that individual schools are 
sacrificed in service to what is perceived as the greater good.  In this sense, the focus of reform is 
the local educational system, not individual schools.  
Reforming Individuals 
Human capital.  Implicit also in the use of school closure as a reform is the assumption 
that the primary problem with failing schools is that the adults who work in them lack 
fundamental skills and dispositions that are fixed rather than fluid (Cohen, 2007; Rice & Malen, 
2003).  Hence, professional development is not viewed as an effective approach to school 
reform.  Rather, reconstitution is predicated on a simple theory of action: only a more coherent 
and competent staff will improve student outcomes.  How one develops such staff is not a 
concern.  What matters is gathering adults who are able to address the school’s needs, who bring 
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 new abilities, beliefs, vision and focus (Goldstein, Keleman & Koski, 1998; Rice & Malen, 
2003; Ziebarth, 2002). 
Some proponents of school reconstitution also view the policy as a means of implementing 
a market-based approach to school reform.  These advocates suggest that the system of tenure 
and seniority inhibits the free market flow of teachers across schools.  The teacher labor market 
has difficulty attracting high-quality individuals to the profession and even more difficulty 
removing ineffective teachers.  Thus, the closure and reopening of a school serves to force the 
teachers and leadership in the closing school to re-join the labor market as they are “excessed.” 
In this manner, school closures arguably reinstitute essential market mechanisms eliminated 
under teacher tenure rules.  Empirical assessments of closure’s theory of action, however, are not 
particularly conclusive.  
Research clearly supports the links between high-quality teaching and increased student 
learning.  Teacher quality is one of the strongest influences on learning, with stronger effects 
than other factors such as student background, class size, or class composition (Aaronson, 
Barrow & Sander, 2007; Rivkin, Hanushek & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Wright, Horn & 
Sanders, 1997).  Research on leadership and its impacts on school is significantly less conclusive 
than the research on teacher quality, mainly due to the methodological difficulties in 
disentangling leadership effects from other school effects (Branch, Hanushek & Rivkin, 2009).  
Nonetheless, the evidence at least suggests that school principal quality directly affects other 
school conditions that relate to student learning, including student absences and discipline and 
teacher turnover (Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff 2009; Ladd, 2009; Leithwood et al., 2004), and 
through these conditions and mechanisms, indirectly impacts student learning (Branch, 
Hanushek & Rivkin, 2009; Hallenger& Heck, 1996; Horng, Klasik & Loeb, 2009). 
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 While ceding this point, critics of reconstitution note that these theoretical benefits of 
school closure are rarely manifest in practice.  Namely, reconstitution does not in fact result in 
more competent staff.  Virtually no studies allow for causal claims regarding the impact of 
reconstitution on teacher or administrator quality.  The research that does exist identifies a 
number of problems in the implementation of closure policies related to teacher quality.  For 
example, due to a lack of qualified applicants, combined with deficient hiring processes, 
reconstitution policies often fail to raise the quality of teaching staff (Hess, 2003; Rice and 
Malen, 2003; Scott, 2008).  Despite the use of school closures as a means to circumvent rules 
regarding the removal of ineffective teachers, district turnaround efforts often continue to be 
stymied by collective bargaining agreements that do not allow for the reassignment of the most 
effective staff to these schools (Scott, 2008).  One study reports that almost three-quarters of 
newly hired staff in several reconstituted schools had less than one year of teaching experience 
(Rice & Malen, 2003), a characteristic associated with lower teacher quality (Aaronson, Barrow 
& Sander, 2007; Rivkin, Hanushek & Kain, 2005).  Another study examining the 
implementation of school reform under the federal SIG program in California found that 
undertaking SIG-funded reforms, which included turnarounds, resulted in a decrease in average 
years of experience among school staff by over two years (Dee, 2012).  The effect of these 
challenges, however, may attenuate over time (Hess, 2003). 
Social capital.  While human capital theory might call for the replacement of an entire 
school staff, social capital theory might call for similar but much less drastic measures.  Under 
social capital theory, social relationships and structures facilitate—or constrain—productive 
activity, expertise, access to resources and the quality of these resources (Coleman, 1988; Dika 
& Singh, 2002).  Although social capital theory applied to education frequently relates to the role 
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 of the family and student social capital (Dika & Singh, 2002), it also can apply to school 
communities, as the relationships among teachers, administrators and other school staff facilitate 
instructional quality and access to institutional resources through shared norms about obligations 
and expectations, such as mutual support and reciprocity, levels of trust and access to expertise 
and information (Coleman, 1988; Dika & Singh, 2002; Penuel, Riel, Krause & Frank, 2009).  
Schools with high levels of social capital, then, may be more likely to have shared expectations 
and goals and greater capacity to work towards these shared goals through high levels of 
collaboration and collective problem-solving and the sharing of expertise and resources to 
improve instructional practice (Israel & Beaulieu, 2001; Penuel et al., 2009).  
Social capital theory is similar to accountability incentive theories in that it attributes lack 
of school improvement to a lack of collective action (Dee, 2012), but has slightly different 
implications for how to increase collective action by reforming structures within the school site 
rather than outside the school community.  Social capital theory suggests that moving teachers in 
a chronically underperforming to other schools with more productive and collaborative climates 
would improve their instruction and performance, while under human capital theory, we would 
expect these teachers to perform just as poorly in a new setting.  While human capital theory 
calls for the replacement of the entire school staff with more competent individuals, social 
capital theory might require the replacement of a school's leadership or a smaller threshold of 
staff to allow for reshaping of the structure and processes to support social capital development.  
The minimum threshold could be close to the 50 percent staff replacement requirement of the 
federal school turnaround approach, or could be a smaller threshold limited to replacement of the 
principal, an approach that would fit under the federal transformation model.  
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 However, there is little evidence regarding a causal connection between increased student 
achievement and reforms that target increased teacher collaboration through such structures as 
teacher teaming or professional learning communities, although the cross-sectional studies 
provide some suggestive evidence that efforts to increase social capital within a school could be 
effective (Corcoran & Silander, 2008; Lee & Smith, 1996; Supovitz, 2002).  For example, one 
study found a positive relationship between student learning and levels of both collective 
responsibility for student learning and cooperation among high school staff.  However, as this 
study is cross-sectional it does not support the conclusion that implementing a reform to increase 
collaboration and collective responsibility for student learning necessarily would impact student 
learning—that is, teacher beliefs about the limitations of students’ ability to learn might not be 
alterable (Lee & Smith, 1996).  Thus implications for closure and reconstitution versus the less 
dramatic school transformation options are unclear, particularly given that these studies tend to 
focus on the transformation of school social capital with existing school staff and few if any 
studies examine replacing school staff to develop more productive social capital.  
Professional development.  Opponents of reconstitution further contend that the reform is 
an overly simplistic approach that does not take into account the skills required to improve 
instruction (Ziebarth, 2002), and further, that school closures and the efforts required to hire new 
staff may detract from instructional planning (Scott, 2008).  During the first few years of 
operation, tasks associated with planning and developing new policies, procedures, establishing 
school and professional development programs, ordering supplies and staff recruiting and hiring 
serve as a significant challenge for new school staff (Young et al., 2009).  Further, new schools 
tend not to evidence large growth in student achievement in their early years of operation 
(Bifulco & Ladd, 2004; Gronberg & Jansen, 2001; Young et al., 2009).   
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 Another set of critics of the current NCLB provisions and accountability structure suggest 
that failing schools need greater capacity to implement good instruction, and that rather than 
replacing teachers, districts need to provide instructional support for the existing teachers in the 
underperforming schools.  In contrast to approaches to school reform in which teacher quality is 
understood as fixed, this alternative perspective argues for strengthening schools by enhancing 
teacher knowledge and skill (see Darling-Hammond, 2000; Ingersoll, 1999).  Elmore (2006) 
characterizes the differences in these two competing approaches as “extracting” knowledge 
versus “developing” knowledge.  Thus one could characterize reconstitution as an extracting 
approach; implicit is the assumption that teachers are either qualified or unqualified, and 
effective schools are able to extract that knowledge.  In contrast, Elmore (2006) argues that 
under the development approach to school improvement, one assumes a base knowledge, but 
school organizations must work to continue to develop that knowledge to continue to provide 
effective instruction.  In this manner, high-quality teaching is conceived as a technology, rather 
than a fixed attribute.   
A central question, however, is the extent to which the instructional capacities of school-
based staff can be improved.  Research on the effectiveness of targeted professional development 
efforts is mixed, with few studies indicating that small-scale  professional development efforts 
can increase student achievement (Carpenter, Fennema, Peterson, Chiang, and Loef, 1989; 
Desimone, 2009; Wayne, Yoon, Zhu, Cronen, & Garet, 2008), while more large-scale 
professional development programs with multiple trainers tend to have no evidence of impact on 
student learning (Garet et al., 2008; Glazerman et al., 2008).  This variation in impact, combined 
with the fact that none of the studies that evidence positive impacts on student learning focus 
specifically on the impact of professional development efforts in our lowest-performing schools, 
12
 calls into question the use of professional development as a sole remedy for chronically 
underperforming schools.  Moreover, the difficulties and inconsistencies in the effects of these 
types of programs raise the question of whether whole-school improvement is possible.  I turn 
now to the broad body of literature that addresses this question. 
Institutional Change 
Advocates of school closure have suggested that the reform may serve as an external shock 
that dislodges ineffective school instructional practices and cultures in a way that other mandates 
are unable to do.  One district administrator, in discussing New York City’s approach to school 
closure and reconstitution describes the reform as targeting the school as an organization: “the 
question was not only changing the adults and the management of the school – the question was 
taking the opportunity to create school structures and enrollment patterns that were more likely 
to lead to success…. It was the targeting of dysfunctional school organizations…where we could 
wipe the proverbial slate clean so that we could begin the process of reconstitution” (Harries, 
2009).   
From an institutional theory standpoint, traditional school reform efforts fail because they 
do not take into account the institutional environment of schools—specifically, the notorious 
impenetrability of school cultures and their ability to resist change.  Instruction, and the policies 
and structures that govern it, are “loosely coupled” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1978), such that 
schools satisfy bureaucratic demands by making symbolic changes rather than investing in 
efforts to transform classroom practice. The challenge is that bureaucratic requirements are often 
unrelated to organizational effectiveness (Honig & Hatch, 2004; Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1978; 
Weick, 1976). Interpreted in this light, school closures represent an attempt to circumvent 
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 existing school cultures by creating new organizations that are more tightly linked to the delivery 
of instruction.   
The generally weak track record of school reforms lends some support to this view.  One 
meta-analysis of school reform initiatives reported that the success rate, defined as sufficient 
improvement in standardized test scores to meet state standards, stood at around fifty percent 
(Brady, 2003).  This finding is reflected in more recent studies of improvements in average 
school achievement over time.  For example, not taking into account changes in student 
characteristics, approximately two-thirds of California schools in the lowest quartile of average 
performance in 1989 remained in the lowest quartile twenty years later (Loveless, 2010).  A 
related study examining both low-performing charter and traditional public school achievement 
from 2002 to 2008 in ten states found that approximately twenty percent of these schools were 
able to improve student achievement to rise above their state’s bottom quartile of proficiency, 
and that charter schools were no more likely than traditional public schools to improve (Stuit, 
2010). 
The results of organizational turnaround efforts in other sectors provide a similarly dreary 
picture (Kowal & Hassel, 2005).  For example, Kotter (1995) asserted that 70 percent of 
turnaround efforts in the private sector fail.  Studies of specific private sector turnaround 
approaches such as Total Quality Management and Business Process Reengineering echo these 
findings (Hess & Gift, 2009).  The general failure of school reforms to improve chronically 
under-performing schools, coupled with similar disappointments in other sectors, suggests that 
school improvement may require abandoning traditional within-the-system approaches to school 
reform for more dramatic  disruptions of school instructional practices and cultures. 
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 Research on the development of small schools and small learning communities (SLCs) 
within schools provides some support for the creation of new schools rather than the 
restructuring of existing schools.  Justifications for creating smaller schools and SLCs are 
commonly based on the premise that smaller schools can offer better guidance and personal 
attention for students, decrease disciplinary problems and create a safer school environment, 
increase teacher empowerment, leadership, and collaboration within and across disciplines, 
promote more efficient administration via a simpler administrative hierarchy, and lead to a more 
responsive and focused curricula (Oxley, 1989; Raywid, 1995).  Small learning communities 
(SLCs) have arisen out of the small schools movement as a feasible method with which to 
implement the small school model using existing structures (Springer, Houck, Ceperley & 
Hange, 2007; Lee & Ready, 2007; Raywid, 1995).   
Research on the creation of small standalone schools suggests that small schools tend to 
have better academic outcomes, higher rates of attendance, more positive climates and fewer 
disciplinary problems compared to large schools (Barrow et al., 2010; Bloom et al., 2010; 
Fowler, 1992; Lee & Smith, 1995).  In contrast, research evidence on the impact of SLCs 
suggests mixed effects (AIR & SRI, 2005; Herlihy & Kemple, 2004; Kemple, Herlihy & Smith 
2004).  These studies reported that restructuring schools into SLCs can result in structural 
changes unconnected to teaching and learning despite support from teachers and administration 
for the reform.  For example, restructuring schools into SLCs does not necessarily result in 
increased teacher collaboration, and even if the restructuring fosters new practices, they do not 
necessarily lead to more innovative nor more effective teaching (Lee & Ready, 2007).  The 
positive impacts of new small schools on learning, compared to the lack of impact, on average, 
of schools that are restructured into SLCs provides some suggestive, although not conclusive, 
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 evidence that school closure and creation of new schools may be a more effective reform 
compared to restructuring or re-organizing an existing school. 
Students, Families and Communities 
Student composition.  Critics of school reconstitution contend that one of the most 
disturbing aspects of the policy is that the new schools do not serve the same types of students 
that the closed school had served.  These critics charge that the new schools do not serve the 
students in the community, or that the reconstituted schools select only higher-performing 
students (ACNY & AALDEF, 2009; Plasencia & Agarwal, 2009).  For example, reform efforts 
in Chicago may have encouraged principals to push out students who were chronically absent 
(Hess, 2003).  As such, already under-served communities may be left with even fewer 
educational resources.  Furthermore, school closures may represent an added burden on students 
who are reassigned to schools outside of their neighborhood (Bellandi, 2009).  
 On the other hand, it is possible that such changes in enrollment patterns might positively 
alter the socio-demographic composition of schools.  Although not always explicitly stated, New 
York City’s reconstitution reforms are part of a larger effort to move away from neighborhood 
schools to what the administration perceives as more equitable district-wide choice and 
enrollment patterns (Harries, 2009; NYC DOE official, personal communication, October 2008).  
In short, reconstitution may serve as a means to lessen the high concentrations of poor and low-
achieving students.  
Research on the relationship between school composition and student learning provides 
some support for this potential impact of reconstitution.  Specifically, higher levels of aggregate 
peer achievement are related to increased student learning, and this impact is stronger for 
students with lower levels of achievement (Barber, 1961; Borman & Dowling, 2010; Finn, 1987; 
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 Hanushek, Kain, Markman and Rivkin, 2003; Summer & Wolfe, 1977; Zimmer & Toma, 2000).  
Research on school choice suggests that when students move to a school with higher-average 
performance levels, students tend to learn more, on average (Hastings & Weinstein, 2008).  
However, it is important to note that little research exists on impact of school reconstitution on 
the composition of a school’s student body, specifically.  Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that closure may result in greater concentration of low-achieving students in schools nearby the 
closed school as these schools absorb students who would otherwise have attended the failing 
school (Freedman, 2008; Robinson, 2011).  Addressing these unresolved questions is a central 
focus of my dissertation. 
Parent and community involvement.  Although the above research on student body 
composition suggests that altering enrollment patterns might result in greater equity, others 
contend that closures may sever important links between schools and the surrounding 
neighborhoods.  Opponents of school closure argue that local connections are important in 
ensuring parent involvement in schools and in creating and tailoring a school environment and 
program that is more responsive to local needs and values, and thus more effective in serving 
students.  On an individual level, connections between parents and their children’s schools, such 
as communication with staff and attendance at school events, positively impacts student 
achievement (Epstein & Sanders, 2002; Grolnick & Slowiaczek, 1994; Hill & Tyson, 2009; 
Jeynes, 2005; 2007; Lareau, 1987).  Conversely, research on student mobility is able to link at 
least part of the detrimental effect of mobility on achievement to declines in social relationships 
or social capital (Pribesh & Downy, 1999) as students shifting to new schools following closure 
experience weaker relationships with teachers (Kirshner, Gaertner & Pozzoboni, 2010).  
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 In addition to individual family involvement, at the collective level, parent collaboration 
and participation in local school councils and in local decision-making might serve to increase 
the accountability and effectiveness of the school administration and school bureaucracies and 
make reforms more sustainable (Fine, 1993; Fung, 2004; Henderson & Mapp, 2002; Henig et al., 
2011).  Participation in decision-making processes might also serve to increase parent 
engagement and increase parental expectations.  However, it is difficult to definitively connect 
school closures and reconstitution to decreases in individual or collective parental involvement, 
particularly in urban areas where the alternate receiving schools are often a few blocks from each 
other, and given that parent involvement is likely already quite low in the under-performing 
schools selected for closure.  Moreover, these concerns may be less salient in New York City, 
given its somewhat unique approach to school closures. 
Impact of Closure and Reconstitution on Student Learning 
Despite the considerable controversy surrounding the reform, its dramatic effects on 
students, school staff, and communities, and its increasing popularity, surprisingly little research 
has assessed the causal impacts of school closures on student outcomes (Rice & Malen, 2003).  
Those studies that did so were mainly small descriptive case studies (Galleta & Ayala, 2008; 
Rice & Malen, 2003; Goldstein, Keleman & Koski, 1998) or observational studies (Scott, 2008; 
Hess, 2003), and often covered only a few years (Hess, 2003; Rice & Malen, 2003).  More recent 
studies suggest mixed results.  A study of the implementation of the federal SIG program in 
California, which includes both the federal turnaround and transformation model to school 
reform, found a small positive effect on student test scores for the lowest-achieving schools, with 
higher impacts for schools using the school turnaround model.  The study did not find significant 
effects for "higher" low-performing schools (i.e., "persistently low-achieving schools" that did 
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 not meet the lowest-achieving five-percent threshold but did meet the "lack of progress" 
threshold as defined under the SIG guidelines; Dee, 2012).   
Additionally, a few studies have examined district-level school closure reforms in detail.  
One investigation of Chicago K-8 schools found that students leaving closed schools tended to 
transfer to equally poorly performing schools.  Examination of student learning one year later 
suggested no impact on student learning (de la Torre & Gwynn, 2009).  Student learning varied 
by the quality of the receiving school, with students transferring to schools with higher average 
achievement learning more than they would have had they remained in the closed school.  A 
small-scale study of the closure of one school in another urban district found a decline in student 
test scores in the two years following closure, and a decline in the probability of graduation 
(Kirshner, Gaertner & Pozzoboni, 2010).  Note, however, that the policy in both studies was to 
close schools and move students immediately rather than allowing for students to phase out with 
the school as New York’s policy is designed to do.  Thus, it is not clear how applicable these 
conclusions are to New York, where problems related to student mobility and efforts to establish 
ties to new adults may be less relevant.  My dissertation is an attempt to address this major 
weakness in the literature. 
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 New York City Context 
Before examining the implementation and impact of closure and reconstitution in New 
York City, it is important to understand the details of the policy and contexts governing and 
shaping the reform initiative, and to illuminate the specific policy mechanisms and conditions 
that may drive any impacts on student outcomes.  These details may also assist in identifying 
whether it is possible to generalize this study’s findings to other contexts.  
New York City Public Schools 
The New York City Department of Education governance structure is a form of mayoral 
control.  In 2002, the state legislature granted Mayor Bloomberg control over the city school 
system.  The same year, Bloomberg appointed Joel Klein as Chancellor.  In January 2011, 
Cathleen Black succeeded Klein as Chancellor of the city schools; she was replaced in March 
2011 by Dennis Walcott.  Although I describe school closures from 1998 through 2008, my 
analysis of the impact of closure focuses on closures during the Bloomberg/Klein administration, 
which launched a series of district-wide school reform initiatives beginning in 2002-3, titled the 
Children First Initiative.     
The Children First Initiative encompassed a series of sweeping, District-wide reforms. 
These efforts began with the establishment of mayoral control and the dismantling of the 32 local 
community school boards.  A central focus of Children First was on devolving power from the 
central office and local community districts to principals and schools.  Principals were granted 
greater authority over hiring processes, school budgets, instructional programs, and professional 
development.  Rather than report to local district superintendents, schools selected from twelve 
"School Support Organizations" that were responsible for meeting schools’ professional 
development needs and other support. The District granted this increased autonomy to schools in 
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 exchange for increased accountability for meeting specific performance goals. The Department 
also introduced a number of a number of structures and processes to support accountability, 
including student, teacher and parent surveys of the school environment, annual progress reports 
and more in-depth school quality reviews, the establishment of inquiry teams of teachers and 
staff at each school to examine student data and chart improvement strategies, and the 
development of a comprehensive electronic data system (O'Day, Bitter & Talbert, 2011).  Also 
during this time, the administration began implementing its central school turnaround policy, the 
New School Initiative. 
Federal and State School Turnaround Policies 
Governing the DOE’s approach to school turnaround are Federal and New York State 
policies and initiatives.  Specifically, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) act requires that states 
set annual performance standards and track school progress towards meeting the standards based 
on student performance on annual state assessments.  Schools must make “adequate yearly 
progress” (AYP) in the percentage of students who pass these tests, and states must identify Title 
I schools that fail to make AYP.  NCLB’s ultimate sanction for schools that continue to fail to 
meet AYP for the fifth year is “restructuring,” which focuses on changing the governance and 
staffing of the school.  The provisions under this sanction call for districts to implement one of 
five restructuring options: close and re-open the school as a charter school; arrange for a state to 
take over the direct operation of the school; replace the entire school staff, including the 
principal; turn management of the school over to a private agency; restructure school governance 
in accord with state direction; and a sixth option, loosely defined as undertaking “some other 
restructuring of school governance” (Scott, 2008).   
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 New York State monitors school performance using the “Registration Review” process, 
first established in 1989.  Under this state accountability policy, the state identifies schools not 
making adequate progress on state assessments; schools that are “farthest from meeting these 
minimum standards” and “judged by the Commissioner to be most in need of improvement” are 
placed on the Schools Under Registration Review (SURR) list and threatened with the possibility 
of losing registration; the final sanction for these schools is closure (NYSED, 2010a).  Between 
1989 and 2010, the state closed 70 schools across the state for lack of adequate progress; this 
number includes some but not all of the schools closed by New York City (NYSED, 2010b).   
Although the identification of the 'worst' schools in New York City sounds quite similar under 
federal and State policies, there is little overlap between those identified by New York State and 
through the federal accountability system (Stiefel, Bel Hadj Amor & Schwartz, 2005), 
highlighting the complications that may exist in implementing these policies. 
In the past few years, New York State has heightened its focus on school closure in 
response to federal policy changes regarding school turnarounds, including the Race to the Top 
and School Improvement grant initiatives.  In 2010, New York State broadened its list of schools 
to be closed to include the bottom five percent of schools in the state, identified as “Persistently 
Lowest Achieving” (PLA); all schools in this category (including SURR schools) must 
implement one of the federal government’s four turnaround strategies, one option of which is 
closure and reconstitution.  The state assigns schools to the PLA category that are in the 
restructuring phase of the accountability system and that did not meet a minimum performance 
level the year prior and did not make a minimum point-gain over three years prior to the 
designation.  Additionally, high schools with graduation rates below 60 percent for three years 
prior to the current school year were also added to the list (NYSED, 2010c). 
22
 New York City’s Approach to School Turnarounds 
New York City has taken a more aggressive approach to school turnarounds than called 
for by state guidelines, often preemptively restructuring schools.  District administrators describe 
NYC’s approach to school turnarounds during Chancellor Klein’s tenure as centered on closure 
and restart (Harries, 2009).  The city’s central turnaround effort, the New School Initiative, 
resulted in the closure of over 80 schools and the creation of 335 new traditional schools and 
over 86 new charter schools between 2002 and 2009.  The majority of the schools that have been 
closed and re-opened were high schools, although the district also closed 31 middle schools and 
opened 66 new middle schools during this time period.  The district’s approach to turnarounds 
has focused on changing the staffing and management of chronically low-performing schools, 
and ostensibly altering both school structures and enrollment patterns by replacing large failing 
schools with small schools and reducing the concentration of low-achieving students within a 
school (Harries, 2009).  
The city bases decisions to close schools primarily on academic achievement (Harries, 
2009; Independent Budget Office [IBO], 2010).  The current closure process includes identifying 
schools that receive a grade of a D or lower on the most recent school progress report or three 
consecutive grades of C, or that have been rated as “below proficient” on the most recent School 
Quality Review.  Because these criteria include a large number of schools, the DOE narrows the 
list of schools by eliminating from selection new schools, schools with a “well-developed” rating 
on their School Quality Review, elementary or middle schools that have test scores above their 
community district average, and high schools with graduation rates above the city average (IBO, 
2010).  However, the decision is not based solely on accountability data.  The DOE’s decision to 
close a school is also based on whether enrollment has declined at the school (a potential 
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 indicator of parent or student satisfaction), data on school staff and leadership and community 
needs, and input from superintendents and school network leaders (Harries, 2009; IBO, 2010).  
Specific school closure policies prior to the Bloomberg administration are more difficult 
to disentangle.  The closure policies do not appear to have been as systemic in nature as those in 
place during the Bloomberg and Klein administration.  Two different chancellors served between 
1998 and 2002, and New York City school governance was less centralized prior to 2002. One 
result was that Local District Superintendents had more control over school closures.  For 
example, Brooklyn middle school closures in 2000, at which time the District was under 
Chancellor Harold Levy's tenure (2000-2002), were led and carried out by Local Superintendent 
Carmen Fariña due to declining enrollment and a budget shortfall (Gittrich, 2001).  At least three 
middle school closures in 2001 were at the behest of New York State; the public rationale for 
closure focused on the fact that these schools had languished on the New York State SURR list 
for over a decade (Shin, 2000).  Closures under Chancellor Rudy Crew in 1998 and 1999 
appeared to have been driven by the Chancellor and not the Local Superintendents (who were 
themselves targeted by the Chancellor for removal).  Chancellor Crew cited low test scores, as 
well as numerous years spent on the New York State SURR list, as justification for these 
closures (Hartocollis & Holloway, 1999).  Closures in 1997 also were directed by Chancellor 
Crew (although there is some evidence that Local District Superintendents exercised some power 
in preventing, if not implementing, school closure during this time) and conducted in response to 
the State's demands (Hartocollis, 1997; Sorensen & Goodman, 1997), while the 1998 and 1999 
closures appear to have been pre-emptively conducted by the city.    
Once the city announces closure decisions, parents, students, community members and 
some local politicians usually respond with opposition, which appears to have grown stronger 
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 and more acrimonious over the past few years.  For example, one community group sued the city 
to allow them to site their protests on the sidewalk in front of the mayor’s residence (Otterman, 
2010).  During another protest, twenty-four protestors, including two city councilmembers, were 
arrested (Christ, 2011).  This increased opposition may stem from several factors: the district has 
accelerated closures each year; the schools closed in later rounds are less clearly dysfunctional 
(Robinson, 2011); and a growing perception that district policy decisions are unilateral.   
Despite this recent vocal opposition, only in a few cases have groups managed to alter 
closure decisions.  In Winter 2010, the NAACP, teachers’ union, local politicians and other 
community members filed a successful lawsuit to postpone school closures that year, based on a 
technicality related to a new state regulation requiring the district to provide an educational 
impact statement and extensive advance notice of closures.  However, the city reintroduced the 
decision to close schools the following year (Walz, Arp & Phillips, 2011).  In response the UFT 
and NAACP filed a second lawsuit against the closures, but was unsuccessful (Cramer, 2011).  
In 2012, the UFT brought a third lawsuit, which was successful in reversing the District's 
proposed turnaround—a process similar to the District's approach to closure in that it would 
require firing the principal and more than half the staff, but would not displace students—of 
another 24 schools in the 2012-13 school year (Baker, 2012). 
Critics of the city’s selection process suggest that the schools identified for closure serve 
students who have much greater needs than students at other schools.  For example, a 2010 
Independent Budget Office report found that students in high schools identified for closure were 
more likely to require special education and English-language learner services, come from low-
income families, live in temporary housing, have lower eighth-grade test scores and to have been 
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 retained, compared to high schools that were not selected for closure.  However, these disparities 
were not found in the middle and elementary school comparisons (IBO, 2010). 
Phase-out.  New York does not close a “failing” school and immediately open another.  
Rather, schools are, with a few exceptions, phased out and phased in over several years.  For 
example, once a school is slated to be closed, the school will cease admitting new students that 
next fall, but allow currently enrolled students to continue, closing once the last group of 
admitted students has graduated.  DOE administrators suggest that the phase-out process allows 
for more personal attention to students as the schools get smaller and that students in phasing-out 
schools are more likely to graduate than students who attended the school prior to the phase-out 
process (Cramer, 2011; Fertig, 2011).  Critics suggest, however, that as the phasing out schools 
lose facilities such as libraries, drop extra-curricular activities and excess teachers, that the city 
has underestimated the drop-out rates during phase-out (Rowland, 2011). 
Reconstitution.  As schools phase-out, new schools typically phase-in within the same 
building.  Many of these new schools are smaller than the closed school, therefore multiple 
schools may open in a building at the same time.  In opening the new schools, rather than 
prescribing instructional practices, the district has emphasized the need for a coherent 
instructional plan and evidence of capacity to implement it from the new school founders and 
administration.  To support leadership capacity, the district developed the New School 
Development and New School Intensive Professional Development Academies, in partnership 
with the New York City Leadership Academy, to provide future principals of the new schools 
with professional development and support in planning the turnaround process.  Additionally, the 
district has planned for the phasing in or growth of a new school over several years to allow time 
for new principals to develop capacity to lead.  Most of the new small schools are supported by 
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 partnerships with educational management or other nonprofit and community organizations that 
hold expertise in new school development.  The district provided schools with additional start-up 
funds as well (Harries, 2009). 
Enrollment processes in these new small schools are the same for any district school.  
Most elementary school students attend local zoned schools, although some gifted and talented 
and other specialized schools draw students from a whole community district.  Enrollment 
processes in middle schools vary.  Some middle schools are zoned, but many middle schools 
enroll any student within the community district or in some cases, borough-wide.  The unzoned 
schools enroll students through a special application or lottery.  At the high school level, all 
students must select a school to attend and enrollment is district-wide.  Processes vary from the 
most selective schools, which require specific achievement levels, to limited unscreened schools, 
which give preference to students who attend a school information session, to unscreened 
schools in which students are randomly selected by a computer, sometimes based on ensuring a 
diverse student body.  Finally, the district also sites charter schools in the buildings formerly 
occupied by the closed schools.  In the charter schools, enrollment is based on lottery, and is not 
circumscribed by catchment area (Inside Schools, 2011). 
Anecdotal reports suggest that nearby schools often receive an influx of high-need 
students when a neighboring school is closed, many of whom enter with particularly low test 
scores and/or behavior issues because the newly opened schools will not accept them (Freedman, 
2008; Robinson, 2011).  A report conducted by the Center for New York City Affairs found that 
many remaining comprehensive high schools experienced an influx of students between 2003 
and 2008 (Hemphill, Nauer, Zelon & Jacobs, 2009).  However, because the report provides no 
comparison to trends in similar schools not located near closures or from where the influx of 
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 students are enrolling, it is impossible to know whether the increases in attendance are due to the 
closures specifically.  Additionally, prior to 2007, for the first three years of operation the newly 
reconstituted schools were not required to enroll students that required special education or 
English language learner services, under the theory that they would need to spend the first few 
years of operation developing sufficient capacity to serve the additional needs of students in 
these categories.  However, in response to a complaint filed with the U.S. Office for Civil Rights 
and criticisms that these newly reconstituted middle and high schools were not serving the same 
population of students that attended the closed school, the city changed its policy for the new 
schools in 2007, requiring that new schools accept ELL and special education students when 
they open, rather than delaying serving these types of students (Gewertz, 2006; Gootman, 2006).  
The lack of evidence surrounding these competing claims calls for more research on the 
implementation and impact of school closures as a reform for low-performing schools.  
Research Focus and Guiding Questions 
Despite the considerable controversy surrounding the reform, surprisingly little research 
has assessed the impact of school closure and reconstitution on students and schools.  I begin by 
examining issues related to implementation of the policy in the first results chapter.  Which 
schools are selected for closure and how can we characterize the types of students and 
communities who experience it?  In that chapter, I explore the extent to which the characteristics 
of reconstituted schools actually differ from the schools they replaced.  In the second results 
chapter, I describe the implementation of the school phase-out process.  I examine impact in the 
final results chapter.  Using an expansive ten-year longitudinal database of students and schools 
in New York City, I assess the links between school closure and student academic development.  
 For the impact analysis, there are a number of conceivable impacts, treatment groups, and 
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 counterfactuals. I focus specifically on comparing outcomes for two groups of students: students 
who attend the to-be-closed schools before school closure is announced, compared to students 
who would have attended the to-be-closed schools had they not closed and who instead attend 
the schools that reconstituted the closed schools or other neighboring schools. That is, I compare 
the academic development of students who would have gone to the closed schools to that of 
students who did go to the closed, chronically failing schools, before these schools were 
identified for closure and ceased to enroll students. I do not explore, for example, the impact of 
phasing out a school for students who attended the to-be-closed schools at the time of the closure 
announcement and later.  
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 Chapter 2: Data and Methods 
Data 
My dissertation employs longitudinal New York City Department of Education 
administrative data on New York City students from 1999 to 2009, supplemented with school-
level data from the New York State Department of Education and the Common Core of Data 
from the National Center for Education Statistics.  New York City is the nation’s largest public 
school district, serving approximately 1.1 million students in just under 1,700 schools. The city 
serves a diverse group of students: 31% are black, 40% Hispanic, 14% white, and 15% other 
minorities, including Asian and multi-racial students (NYSED, 2011). Just under half of the 
student population (42%) speaks a language other than English at home (NYC DOE, 2007).   
I focus specifically on middle schools students.  My base sample includes students with at 
least one test score for a middle school grade (sixth, seventh or eighth grade; n=1,066,175).  
Because middle school students are more likely to have both mathematics and English test scores 
available annually several years prior to entering middle school and are tested every year during 
middle school, this age group lends itself well to a longitudinal analysis of the impact of school 
closure on student learning. High school students, in contrast, are not required to take English 
and mathematics assessments annually, and elementary school students are not assessed until 
third grade. Moreover, attendance zones at the middle school level are more circumscribed by 
the 32 geographic community school districts, compared to high school enrollment, which is 
city-wide.1 Slightly more constrained attendance patterns allow for the establishment of more 
plausible counterfactuals of the schools students would have attended had their school not 
                                                 
1The New York City School District is divided into 32 community school districts across the five boroughs. These community 
districts constrain attendance zones for middle and elementary school students so that, with the exception of a few specialized 
schools, middle and elementary schools only serve students from one of the 32 districts. The districts hold relatively limited 
administrative duties, related to zoning, supervision of school administrators and parent support. 
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 closed. Additionally, in contrast to the high school reconstitution initiative, the District’s 
approach to closing middle schools does not always include replacement with new small schools. 
In some cases, middle schools were replaced with schools of the same size. Thus the impact of 
small school reform potentially can be disentangled a little more clearly from closure. Finally, 
the lack of research on middle schools and reconstitution provides a compelling reason to 
examine the policy from the perspective of middle schools. 
Measures 
Academic outcomes. Student scores on annual New York State English and mathematics 
standardized assessments and student absences, as measured by number of days absent per 
semester, serve as my primary outcomes.  
Standardized assessment outcomes.  Beginning in 1999, students in grades 4 and 8 were 
administered state standardized assessments, including multiple choice and open-ended questions 
aligned to state standards in English Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics. In an effort to 
assess every student annually, the city supplemented the state assessments with city assessments 
for students in grades 3, 5, 6 and 7. These city assessments were aligned with the state standards 
but included only multiple choice questions (NYC DOE, 2009). Both of these state and city 
assessments are criterion-referenced, and produce IRT scale-scores that are vertically equated, 
allowing for comparisons within and across grades. However, in Spring 2006, New York State 
expanded the state assessment program to include assessment of all students in grades 3 through 
8, thus replacing city assessments in grades 3,5, 6 and 7. The new 2006 New York State 
assessments are not vertically equated and do not allow for comparisons of student academic 
growth across grades and years. Rather, the assessment used in 2006 and later years allows 
comparisons between the same grades from year to year (CTB/McGraw Hill, 2006). 
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 Additionally, the state’s alteration of the 2006 test scale, content, scores and range do not allow 
the scores from 2006 and later to be compared to scores from 1999-2005 (NYC DOE, 2008). 
Therefore, to account for these assessment changes, scores are standardized within grade, year 
and subject. Because they are aligned to the state standards, I assume that despite changes in 
scaling and scores, the New York City and New York State assessments measure similar 
aptitudes and thus once standardized are comparable across years within in each subject and 
grade.  Similar approaches have been taken by Boyd et al. (2008) and Schwartz and Steifel 
(2006). 
Social and academic background. It is likely that students who attend schools that are 
closed are quite different from students who attend other district schools. Therefore, I take into 
account a number of student social and academic characteristics that are related to both 
attendance at a chronically underperforming school and student outcomes. These characteristics 
include the number of absences and tardiness incidents each school year. For the matching 
difference-in-differences and fixed effects models (described below), I also coded the attendance 
measures into five-level categorical measures by quantile, to allow for non-linear relationships. I 
measure race/ethnicity using a series of dummy-coded measures of whether the parents reported 
the child was American Indian, Asian or Pacific Islander, black non-Hispanic, white non-
Hispanic, multi-racial, or the parent refused to report, using Hispanic as the uncoded comparison 
group in my analytic models. The models also include an indicator of whether the student ever 
received special education services (yes=1, no=0), whether a language other than English was 
the primary home language (yes=1, no=0), free/reduced lunch eligibility (yes=1, no=0), and 
whether the student was old for their grade either due to delayed school entry or retention, 
defined as 15 months older than the New York City minimum age for sixth grade at the time of 
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 entering sixth grade for the first time (yes=1, no=0). I also account for student mobility, coded as 
the number of elementary schools a student attended. 
School characteristics. School characteristics include year of closure, a measure that I 
calculated by identifying any schools that ceased to enroll students each year. I also confirmed 
this identification using either news reports, NYC DOE press releases, or on-line reviews from 
Inside Schools, a local organization that provides comprehensive evaluations of city schools. 
Other school characteristics include continuous measures of school size (number of students 
enrolled), percent of students eligible for free/reduced lunch, percent of students whose home 
language was not English, percent of students who attend three or more elementary schools, 
school-average achievement as measured by state and city assessments, and school-average 
absence and tardiness rates. I measure racial/ethnic composition using separate continuous 
measures of the percentage of Hispanic, black, white and Asian students in the school. 
Missing Data  
As with most large administrative datasets, students in my sample are missing data on 
particular measures, I relied on imputed data for the impact analyses but used on the existing 
administrative data and federal Common Core of Data from the National Center for Education 
Statistics for the descriptive school-level analyses. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 display the percentage of 
cases missing data for the cohorts of students in the impacts analyses, those students who were 
enrolled in sixth grade in 2001 and later years.  Rates of missing data are higher for earlier 
cohorts.    
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 Table 2-1 
Percent of missing data for student demographic characteristics  




Free/reduced lunch 1.6 
 
Table 2-2 
Percent of missing data for student student academic characteristics  















27.9 23.3 18.6 14.6 26.3 36.5 
Mathematics 
test scoresa 
22.9 19.1 15.3 11.1 22.9 33.9 
Absences       
Fall 51.4 49.7 36.7 21.4 21.8 32.3 
Spring 61.5 38.8 24.9 20.2 32.2 43.0 
Tardies       
Fall 61.5 49.7 36.7 21.4 21.8 32.3 
Spring 51.4 38.8 24.9 20.2 32.2 43.0 
 
 Special education status was a particularly problematic measure. The dataset included a 
two indicators of whether the student has an IEP from different administrative datasets, and the 
two indicators did not overlap entirely. Furthermore, these two indicators did not overlap entirely 
with other indirect indicators of special education status, such as whether the student received an 
IEP diploma, was eligible to take the New York State Alternative Assessment (NYSAA), or 
attended a special education school.  Because of these problems, I coded students as having an 
IEP if they were coded positively for any of these indicators. Similarly, whether a student's home 
language was not English variable did not include a negative indicator: it was coded "Y" if a 
student's home language was not English, and blank otherwise. Therefore, missingness was not 
determined for these two measures.  
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 It is likely that these data are not missing completely at random. For example, low-income 
students are more likely to move in and out of schools and the district and thus more likely to be 
missing test scores. Students whose families do not speak English or have limited literacy skills 
are also less likely to complete administrative questionnaires used to obtain demographic data 
such as gender, race/ethnicity, free/reduced lunch status. Simply dropping cases that are missing 
data would result in a dataset that is more advantaged than the New York City student 
population, and thus may bias my results.  Additionally, because many students have at least 
some missing data, dropping these students and any of their existing measures results in the loss 
of information that could otherwise inform my analysis (Allison, 2002; Rubin, 1987). 
In response, I employ multiple imputation using the “Amelia II” package available for R to 
generate five imputed datasets (Honaker, King & Blackwell, 2011). The multiple imputation 
approach to estimating missing data offers a number of benefits. The method draws from the full 
dataset and thus does not ignore what might be valuable information, unlike list-wise deletion, 
thus affording less biased estimates (Allison, 2002). Additionally, multiple imputation retains the 
relationships between variables within the data, but allows for a more streamlined method to 
impute multiple variables that have missing data simultaneously, rather than variable by variable.  
A third advantage is that multiple imputation accounts for the two types of uncertainty 
surrounding the missing data: model uncertainty and sampling uncertainty.  A major difficulty, 
however, with this approach is that it may be difficult to implement using a large dataset with 
multiple missing values, particularly given computer memory limitations.  Because of these 
limitations, I divided the data into 20 randomly generated groups and imputed each group 
separately, using in each an indicator of cohort (year the student first entered sixth grade)  to 
allow the missing data patterns to vary across cohorts of students. I conduct matching and 
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 estimate the effect of closure using the difference-in-differences and fixed effects approaches 
separately on each of the five imputed datasets, and then combine the results based on Rubin’s 
(1987) approach. In my imputation models I included all variables that were used in the later 
analyses. 
Methods 
Describing Students and Schools 
My initial analyses focus on the implementation of school closure and reconstitution. For 
these descriptive analyses, I include all data on closed middle schools from 1999 through 2008. I 
define middle schools as schools whose lowest grade is between four and seven and highest 
grade between five and nine. I conduct chi-square tests, t-tests and one-way analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) analyses to determine statistically significant relationships. 
Estimating the Effects of School Closure on Student Learning 
Because of the timing of school closures in New York City, combined with the periods 
captured by my data, I limit my impact analyses to middle schools (grades 6-8) whose last year 
of operation was 2006 (5 middle schools closed), 2007 (3 middle schools closed) or 2008 (6 
middle schools closed). Figure 2-1 displays the various cohorts of students affected by the 
closure and phase-out process for each of the three years of closure in my analyses. I compare 
outcomes for students who did enroll in the to-be-closed schools to those who would have had 
the schools not begun to close. The treatment cohorts—students who attend and graduate from 
the chronically failing to-be-closed schools before closure is announced—are colored black. The 
control cohorts—students who attend an alternate receiving school after closure is announced 
and the to-be-closed schools cease admitting new students—are indicated by the dark-gray cells. 
These control students attend either the newly reconstituted schools that replace the to-be-closed 
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 schools, or other neighboring schools. Students who attended the schools during the transitional, 
phase-out process (not included in this study) are indicated by the light-gray cells. I examine 
specifically the impact of attending a school that is later closed for the two cohorts of students 
who enrolled in and graduated from the to-be-closed middle schools three and four years prior to 
the closure announcement and phase-out process in each of the three years of closure (n=5,554), 
compared to two future cohorts of control students who would have attended the closed schools 
had they not closed and who instead attend the reconstituted schools that replace the closed 
schools or other middle schools (n=5,554). My analyses do not include students attending 
schools when closure is announced and during the phase-out process, nor those who leave the 
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Figure 2-1. Student cohorts. 
 
The key challenge in estimating the impact of school closure policies on student outcomes 
is identifying what would have happened in the absence of the reform. Ascribing causality 
requires disentangling a complex process involving multiple policy stages and student and school 
selection and enrollment processes, given that schools are phased out and phased in over several 
years.  My identification strategy rests on a difference-in-differences matching approach 
(Heckman, Ichimura & Todd, 1997). I conceptualize the treatment group as sixth graders who 
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 enrolled in a school that is later closed. A simple approach to examining the impact of attending 
a chronically underperforming school that is later closed would be to compare student test scores 
before and after the school is closed and reopened as a new school. The obvious limitation of this 
approach is the potential for selection bias. That is, it is reasonable to assume that students who 
attended schools selected for closure differ from those who attend the reconstituted schools. 
Indeed, opponents of school closure contend that the newly reconstituted schools do not in fact 
serve students in the community, and that they select only higher-performing students (ACNY & 
AALDEF, 2009; Plasencia & Agarwal, 2009). In addition to lower test scores, the New York 
City Department of Education might also have closed schools whose students and families 
possessed fewer social and political resources to oppose closure. Such resource disparities are 
likely related to student learning as well.  
Matching.  To address concerns about selection bias inherent in this topic, I match students 
who enrolled in chronically failing schools that were subsequently closed (the treatment group) 
to students likely to have enrolled in the closed schools (the counterfactual, or control group) had 
those schools been available. To approximate this counterfactual I employ propensity score 
matching methods to create a control group of students likely to have enrolled in the closed 
schools, but who did not have the opportunity. 
Propensity score analysis involves matching cases based on their shared probability of 
receiving the treatment (here, enrolling in schools selected for closure) conditional given what 
we observe on the case prior to the treatment (the confounding covariates). This allows for the 
identification of a similar group of controls by matching treated cases and control cases on the 
probability of having received the treatment. Traditional linear regression techniques that 
condition on specific covariates ignore the fact that there may be little overlap between the 
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 treatment and control groups—that is, the two groups may be too different along particular 
dimensions to allow for valid comparisons. Propensity score matching restricts these 
comparisons by creating a more balanced sample of matched groups based on particular 
characteristics, a method that does not require extrapolation across areas with minimal data 
(Gelman & Hill, 2007; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
Research on matching suggests that if the treatment is assigned at the school level, 
matching should be conducted at the school level to avoid biased results (Stuart, 2007). 
However, I match on a student-level measure of treatment, using three dummy-coded measures 
of whether the student enrolled in sixth grade in a school that was closed in 2006 (yes=1, no=0), 
2007 (yes=1, no=0) and 2008 (yes=1, no=0). I do so because of the nature of school closure 
policies in New York City, in which the school that is treated ceases to exist, and the resulting 
counterfactual or control condition is not experienced by a school as a whole, but rather by 
students who enroll in multiple alternate schools that contain both control and non-control 
students. Additionally, I focus on enrolling in rather than exclusively attending a to-be-closed 
school, as I aim to estimate the impact of attending a to-be-closed school for students who stay 
the full three years (grades 6-8) as well as for those who leave after a shorter period. It seems 
reasonable that enrolling in a chronically underperforming school would increase (or possibly 
reflect) student mobility. By including "stayers" and "leavers" in my models, my results are 
inclusive of any potential effects of mobility on achievement. Therefore, my approach is an 
estimation of an intent-to-treat (ITT) effect for students enrolled in the schools at baseline.  
I conduct matching separately for each year of closure, identifying three control groups of 
students who enrolled in schools that closed in 2006, 2007 and 2008 in sixth grade three and four 
years prior to the closure announcement. By conducting separate matching for each year of 
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 closure, I allow for the possibility that enrollment patterns may differ across years. I perform 
matching using the “MatchIt” package in R (Ho, Imai, King & Stuart, 2011). In the first step, I 
estimate the probability of enrolling in a middle school that is later closed using a logistic 
regression. I account for a number of student-level covariates related to both treatment 
assignment and the outcome in order to identify the most plausible control group (Heckman, 
Ichimura & Todd, 1997; Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007). Models include students’ state test 
scores in English and mathematics and rates of absences and tardiness for grades three, four and 
five; free and reduced-price lunch eligibility; whether the student ever received special education 
services; whether a language other than English was the primary home language; student 
mobility in elementary school; whether the student was old-for-grade at the beginning of sixth 
grade; and race/ethnicity to compute the probability each student would have enrolled in a 
chronically underperforming school later selected for closure. The estimate from this first step is 
the propensity score.  
In the second step I use one-to-one nearest-neighbor matching without replacement and 
common support to restrict the sample to cases that do not have propensity scores below or 
above the range of propensity scores for the treatment cases (Rubin, 1973). Nearest-neighbor 
matching performs particularly well with datasets that include many more control units than 
treatment units, and if many of the controls are quite different than the treated individuals, which 
is the case with these data (Ho et al., 2007; Stuart, 2010). Because I discard unmatched control 
students, my estimates are the effect of the treatment on the treated.  
I use a particularly restrictive approach to matching students by requiring an exact match 
on the students’ elementary school, selecting the student with the closest propensity score within 
the same elementary school. Given the strong elementary-to-middle school attendance pipelines 
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 in New York City, performing an exact match on elementary schools provides a considerably 
more plausible matching estimate than matching solely on student characteristics. Additionally, 
this approach implicitly controls for any unobserved differences between the treatment and 
control units that are related to elementary school choice, and that are likely associated both with 
family and student decisions to enroll in a chronically underperforming middle school, such as 
family support for learning at home.  I also examine a few other more restrictive matching 
approaches. I restrain the matching using an exact match and second, using Mahalanobis metric 
matching within a caliper of 0.25-.05 SD to limit selection of matches to those with the smallest 
Mahalanobis distance within a small range of propensity scores. I do so for select important 
measures, test scores and attendance rates (Rubin & Thomas, 2000), but with these more 
restrictive approaches too many of the treated students (more than 300) remain unmatched, 
compromising the external generalizability of the study. Therefore, in order to retain the full 
sample of treated students, I relax the exact and Mahalanobis distance matching constraints. I 
also explore oversampling to reduce the variance by using one to two and one to three nearest 
neighbor matching (Smith, 1997) but the oversampling resulted in poorer balance than when 
using one to one nearest neighbor matching.  
I conduct the matching for each of the three years of closure and for each of the five 
multiply imputed datasets. Matching using imputed data tends to result in less bias than matching 
using complete cases, and is equivalent to matching on missing data patterns (Graham 2008; 
Harder, Stuart & Anthony, 2010). To estimate the propensity scores, I use different logit models 
for each of the three years of closure cohorts to allow for optimal balance. I use the same logit 
models, however, across each of the five multiply-imputed datasets.  
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 I use an iterative approach to matching, in which I specify the logit regression using the 
pre-treatment covariates, assess balance, and add interactions and higher-order polynomials for 
unbalanced measures to the logit model in order to address lack of balance. To take into account 
both means and distributions of the covariates, I compare the standardized difference in means--
the means divided by the standard deviation of the treatment group--between the matched 
samples (Stuart, 2009).  Research suggests that sufficient balance can be reached with an 
absolute standardized distance in means of no more .25 between the matched samples (Rubin, 
2001; Stuart, 2009). Others suggest a more stringent threshold of .1 standardized differences in 
means (Austin, 2011; Normand et al., 2001). My matched samples meet the .25 threshold in all 
cases, and the .1 standardized difference threshold with a few exceptions for the 2006 and 2007 
cohorts. Figures 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4 display the absolute standardized differences by student 
characteristic for each of the five imputed datasets by cohort.  These differences are within-
school differences because of the exact match on school attended in fifth grade. For the matched 
cohort of students who attended schools closed in 2006, absolute standardized differences in 
means are slightly greater than .1 for the second-level category within the five-level categorical 
measures of absences in fifth grade and tardies in third and fourth grade. For the matched cohort 
of students who attended schools closed in 2007, absolute standardized differences in means are 
between .1 and .2 for ever having an IEP, free/reduced lunch eligibility, home language, the 
second-level category within the five-level categorical measures of tardies in third and fifth 
grade and the second- and fourth-level category within the five-level categorical measure of 













 Figure 2-3. 2007 Cohort: Absolute standardized differences between matched sample means.  
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  Figure 2-4. 2008 Cohort: Absolute standardized differences between matched sample means.  
 
Modeling impact. Once I create a set of students matched to the treatment groups, I 
estimate student learning as a function of enrolling in a school that was later closed. For these 
analyses, I use a difference-in-differences approach within a multi-level framework (Heckman, 
Ichimura & Todd, 1998; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  Although it seems reasonable to assume 
that treatment and control groups are quite similar after matching via the propensity score 
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 method, additional methods to account for the unmeasured differences in the students across 
these schools seem warranted, and research suggests that using both matching and covariate 
adjustments are more effective in addressing selection bias than matching alone (Rubin, 1979; 
Rubin & Thomas, 2000). Thus, I estimate the effect of the treatment using multi-level cross-
classified models within a difference-in-differences framework in which student test scores from 
grades 5-8 are nested in students who are nested in schools, conditioning on student observed 
characteristics for a more robust estimate of the treatment effect (Hill, 2008; Rubin & Thomas, 
2000; van der Laan & Robins, 2003). Multi-level approaches provide more reliable school-level 
estimates and standard errors than standard OLS techniques (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Singer 
& Willett, 2003; Snijders & Bosker, 1999).  The cross-classified nature of the models allows me 
to account for student mobility from school to school, as students can be nested in multiple 
schools as they progress from elementary school through middle school (Grady & Beretvas, 
2010).  
 My difference-in-differences model compares rates of changes in test scores within the 
control group to rates of changes in test scores within the treatment group across time periods, 
pre- versus post-treatment, as students move from grade five (pretreatment or initial status) 
through eight. The impact of school closure on student learning is the difference between the 
treatment group’s change in test scores and the control group’s change. As indicated in equation 
1, the basic difference-in-difference model can be written as: 
          (1) 
This approach requires one specific assumption to support interpretation of the estimate as 
a causal effect: that the change in mean test scores that the control group experiences over time 





 exposed to the treatment.  The matching conducted prior to the difference-in-difference analysis 
makes this assumption more plausible. Moreover, conditioning on student pre-treatment 
background characteristics when estimating the impact also makes this assumption more 
reasonable.   
In a multi-level regression framework, the difference-in-differences estimation can be 
rewritten as: 
Level 1 (repeated-measures):  
Ytij = π0ij + π1ij(6th grade)tij + π2ij(7th grade)tij + π3ij(8th grade)tij + etij  
Level 2 (individuals):         (2) 
π0ij =β00j+ β01ij (CLOSEDij) + β02ij (Xij- X¯ ) … + r00ij 
 π1ij = β10 j + β11ij (CLOSEDij) + β12ij (Xij- X¯ ) … + r10ij 
 π2ij = β20 j + β21ij (CLOSEDij) + β22ij (Xij- X¯ ) … + r20ij 
 π3ij = β30 j + β31ij (CLOSEDij) + β32ij (Xij- X¯ ) … + r30ij 
Level-3 (schools):  
β00j= γ00 + u0j 
β10j= γ10 + u10j 
β20j= γ20 + u20j 
β30j= γ30 + u30j 
 
The level-1 model estimates the outcome at a given time point (grade), where Ytij is the 
achievement outcome or rate of absences of child i in school j at time t. π0ij is the predicted value 
for individual i in school j when time (grade, in my model) equals 0, or fifth grade.   To account 
for nonlinear changes in student test scores and absences, I use separate indicators of exposure to 
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 each grade. These three measures of school exposure—sixth grade, seventh grade and eighth 
grade—permit the modeling of four distinct parameters: (1) initial status (π0ij), or children’s 
achievement or absences at fifth grade (literally, predicted achievement or absences with 
exposure to zero years of sixth grade, zero years of seventh grade, and zero years of eighth 
grade). The three remaining parameters (π1ij , π2ij  and π3ij ) are linear attendance and learning 
rates or slopes over: (2) sixth grade; (3) seventh grade; and (4) eighth grade. I allow these rates 
to vary within students, and examine the impact of closure separately by the three years of 
closure.  Because the student test score outcomes are standardized within subject, grade and 
school year, rates of learning here are relative to other students, the measure of 'learning' is not 
an indicator of absolute growth, but rather indicates whether the student's test scores moved up 
or down relative to the distribution of all student test scores within that subject, grade and school 
year.  
The level-2 model estimates student learning as a function of the treatment (enrolling in a 
closed schools) and student demographic characteristics (Xij), which are grand-mean centered. 
By interacting grade and whether a student enrolled in a school that was slated for closure, I am 
able to estimate whether students who enrolled in the schools to be closed experience differential 
rates of change between fifth grade and eighth grade—that is, whether the slope of their test 
score trajectories differ having enrolled in later-closed schools compared to enrolling in alternate 
receiving schools.  At the school level (Level 3), γ00 is the average learning in the population and 
u0j is the error term associated with school j. Although they account for the clustered nature of 
the data at the school level, these level 3 models are unconditional in that they do not adjust the 
treatment estimates for school-level characteristics. This is necessary for the simple fact that the 
characteristics of each school vary across the multiple cohorts it serves over time.  
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 I implement these models using the “lme4” package available with R (Bates, Maechler & 
Dai, 2009). Additionally, I conduct these analyses across each of the five imputed datasets, and 
combined the results based on Rubin’s (1987) approach using the “mitools” package in R 
(Lumley, 2010). 
Fixed effects.  One potential bias in the difference-in-differences analysis may stem from 
unobserved student or family characteristics that are related both to change in student outcomes 
over time and enrollment in a chronically-underperforming middle school. As a robustness check 
on these initial results, I include a second approach that measures the impact of school closures 
using an individual fixed-effects model that implicitly holds constant both observed and 
unobserved time-invariant student characteristics by comparing student test-score and attendance 
trajectories within individuals before and during middle school. In this approach, students serve 
as their own counterfactuals to what would have happened had they not attended a to-be-closed 
school. Changes in student outcomes can be interpreted as the change relative to a student's 
outcomes before or after he or she switched schools. An individual fixed-effects model improves 
the plausibility of the assumption that the assignment to the treatment—attending a chronically 
underperforming school—is ignorable because both observed and unobserved characteristics that 
are stable over time are controlled for (Gangl, 2009; Gelman and Hill, 2008; Winship & Morgan, 
1999).2   
This second analysis answers a slightly different question for a slightly different student 
population. Although both models estimate the average effect of the treatment on the treated, my 
first analysis focused on the impact of closure for a future cohort of students who would have 
attended a chronically failing school had it not closed. Rather than focusing on the effects of 
                                                 
2 Note that the original difference-in-differences approach is a version of a fixed-effect model using a student-level 
event (Gangl, 2009), enrolling in a to-be-closed school, rather than the incident-level fixed effects approach 
described above.  
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 school closure after a school has closed, this analysis focused on the impact of attending a 
chronically failing school compared to the counterfactual of attending any other current 
alternative receiving school. The sample in this analysis is limited to students who were in sixth 
grade three and four years prior to the closure announcement and who ever enrolled in a school 
closed in 2006, 2007 or 2008 (n=9,591 students). Therefore, the impact is not necessarily an 
indication of the impact of fully closing a school, but rather, of attending a to-be-closed school 
compared to its contemporary alternatives. If a whole school were closed it seems likely that 
some alternate receiving schools would be flooded with a host of high-need students who would 
have attended the closed school had it not closed. This alternate model does not account for these 
kinds of consequences. Rather, this analysis exploits the high-levels of student mobility in the 
treatment population to examine differences in learning and attendance trajectories as students 
switch in and out of treatment schools.  Additionally, the fixed-effect analysis also focuses on a 
slightly broader treatment of attending a to-be-closed school at any point during middle school, 
while the first analysis focused on the impact of enrolling in 6th grade in a to-be-closed school. 
Although an individual fixed-effects approach may allow for more believable 
assumptions about ignorability of treatment assignment, it also sacrifices some external validity 
and limits the generalization of findings to a smaller population of students. The impact of 
closure is identified only when students change from control to treatment status or vice versa. 
Therefore, the results of this analysis only apply to those students who switched from a to-be-
closed school to a school that was not selected for closure or vice versa at some point during fifth 
through eighth grade.  These mobile students are not a particularly unusual population, however.  
Figure 2-2 below illustrates the high levels of student mobility in the closed schools in this 
sample.  Student mobility patterns in schools that were later closed suggest that of the students 
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 who ever enrolled in one of these schools during the treatment years, more than half (55%) 
switched schools during sixth through eighth grade.  Just under half (45%) attended all three 
years, one-quarter of students attended during seventh through eighth grade, and a final one-
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 As is typical of more mobile students, the students who stay at a to-be-closed school 
before closure is announced for all three years are slightly more advantaged than those who 
move during middle school; the movers' fifth grade ELA and mathematics test score are 
approximately 0.2 SD lower than their less mobile peers, on average. These more mobile 
students also have slightly higher rates of absences and tardiness in fifth grade, are more likely to 
have English as a home language, and are slightly more likely to be old for their grade upon 
entering sixth grade. Thus, the estimates from these fixed-effects models are for a slightly more 
disadvantaged population of students.  
Because of the nested nature of the data, for the fixed-effects analyses I use a multi-level 
approach that is functionally equivalent (but statistically more robust) to traditional OLS fixed-
effect approaches. Specifically, I use adaptive centering with random effects (Raudenbush, 2009) 
in which I group-mean center the incidence-level treatment measures, a dummy-measure of 
whether the student was enrolled that year at a to-be-closed middle school (coded 1 if attending a 
to-be-closed school, 0 otherwise).  For these analyses, I use a two-level growth-curve framework 
in which student outcomes—ELA and mathematics state test scores and logged absences—from 
grades 5-8 are nested in students. Adaptive centering offers an improvement over traditional 
fixed-effects models in two ways. First, it allows for modeling heterogeneous treatment effects 
across students by using random effects (Raudenbush, 2009). Additionally, accounting for the 
clustered nature of the data provides more efficient and reliable estimates and standard errors 
compared to standard OLS regression fixed-effect analyses (Raudenbush, 2009; Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002; Singer & Willett, 2003; Snijders & Bosker, 1999).   
By interacting a students' exposure in prior years to a chronically underperforming school 
with the treatment indicator, I am able to estimate whether students who attend a to-be-closed 
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 school for multiple years experience differential rates of learning—for example, whether 
additional years at a chronically underperforming school compounds the impact of the treatment.  
This incident-level variable is coded 0 for all years prior to entering a to-be-closed school, and 
increases by one each year after the student was enrolled in a to-be-closed school. Finally, to 
help satisfy ignorability of treatment assignment, I also control for grade to account for the fact 
that students are more likely to move schools and to be absent from school in later years. I also 
include cohort fixed effects to account for differences across years.  I conduct the fixed effects 
analyses across each of the five imputed datasets using HLM 6.0 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
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 Chapter 3: Characteristics of Closed and Reconstituted Schools 
  
This chapter focuses on describing implementation of school closure and reconstitution in 
New York City. I examine the characteristics of the schools prior to closure and explore the 
characteristics of the schools that replace the closed schools.  Unsurprisingly, I find that schools 
selected for closure have significantly lower school-average state test scores and lower 
attendance rates compared to other middle schools, in almost all cases for several years prior to 
selection for closure. Furthermore, schools selected for closure enroll students with significantly 
lower levels of achievement prior to middle school compared to students in other schools, 
lending credence to the claim that these schools evidence lower achievement in part because they 
serve high-need students who are already at a disadvantage prior to entering the middle school.  I 
also find that the reconstituted schools that replace the closed schools, while similar 
demographically, tend to enroll students who are less disadvantaged academically, although this 
trend is true only for schools closed and reconstituted in 2004 and later.  
 This descriptive chapter uses all data on closed schools from 1999 through 2008, with a 
focus specifically on middle schools, which I define as schools whose lowest grade is between 
four and seven, and whose highest grade is between five and nine.  I present four sets of 
analyses.  I start with a description of the number of middle schools that have closed in the 
District, and describe the academic and demographic characteristics of schools that were closed, 
comparing characteristics of to-be-closed schools to other middle schools. I also examine 
whether the characteristics of schools selected for closure change across time as the school 
closure policy matures.  
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  Second, I examine the extent to which these schools are chronically underperforming by 
describing the academic characteristics of schools in the years prior to closure.  New York City 
has only recently clarified its policies and processes to identify school closures, partially in 
response to changes in state legislation calling for increased transparency. District administrators 
characterize decisions to close schools as based primarily on a sustained lack of academic 
achievement, which to them suggests that the staff in these schools lack the capacity or will to 
improve. However, the district has historically faced and continues to face contentions that the 
decisions to close schools are biased and based on political favoritism rather than more objective 
rationales, and further, that the reform unfairly targets schools that enroll concentrations of 
minority students. I examine implementation of closure and the characteristics of closed schools 
over time with these charges in mind.   
 Third, I describe the academic characteristics of students prior to enrolling in the to-be-
closed schools with the purpose of determining the extent to which the students who enroll in the 
chronically low-performing schools enter into the school already at a disadvantage.  Finally, I 
describe school reconstitution. The rationale for school closure rests on the assumption that the 
reconstituted schools that replace the closed schools will provide more effective academic 
support and result in higher student academic achievement.  Opponents to school closure argue 
that the reconstituted schools are not more effective and, moreover, that any evidence of higher 
achievement stems from the fact that the new schools do not serve high-need students, such as 
the lowest-achieving students or English-language learners.  To provide insight into these claims, 
I examine the characteristics of the reconstituted schools, comparing these new schools and the 
students who attend them to the characteristics of the closed middle schools and their students.  
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 Schools Closed in New York City from 1998-2008  
 As displayed in Figure 3-1, the New York City DOE closed 66 middle and junior high 
schools between 1997 and 2008. The majority of the closed schools were located in Brooklyn 
and the Bronx, followed by Manhattan. No middle schools in Staten Island were selected for 
closure during this time period.  Additionally, school closure activities did not appear to vary 
much across administrations; the Bloomberg/Klein administration closed a mean of six middle 
schools per year compared to five middle school closures per year in the prior administrations. 
 




 Characteristics of closed schools  
 Table 3-1 displays the academic and demographic characteristics of closed middle 
schools over time, compared to other regular middle schools.3  I examined the characteristics of 
the closed schools three years prior to closure compared to all others middle schools that year.  
Three years prior to closure is the approximate time of the announcement of closure for those 
schools that phase-out over a few years.  My results suggest school-average test scores were 
significantly lower than those of other regular middle schools: closed schools had school-average 
English language arts test scores close to one-half standard deviation below other middle schools 
in most years.4 A similarly-sized gap was evident in math scores between closed and other 
middle schools, although for a few years—2001, 2002 and 2003—the gap was closer to one-third 
standard deviation. Additionally, school-average student absences and tardies were also 
significantly higher at closed schools: school-average absences for closed schools were 
approximately two days higher per semester than other schools, and closer to three days more 
after 2004.  Similarly, school-average tardies were, with the exception of one semester, higher by 
two to six incidences per semester in closed schools compared to other middle schools.  
Although these school-level differences were substantively quite large, the necessarily small 
school sample sizes preclude the ability to identify statistically significant differences.  Rather, 
when possible, I report differences in effect-size units or other meaningful metrics.  
                                                 
3 Not included in this table are schools that serve middle-grades students but with wider grade spans, such as K-12, 
K-8, 6-12 schools.  I also did not include in the middle school comparison group any charter schools or selective 
schools.  
4 I standardized the ELA and mathematics exam scores by computing z-scores within each grade, within each year. 
At the student level, the mean average score is 0.  To present school-average test scores, I aggregated the individual 
scores, already standardized within grade and year, by school. I chose not to aggregate the raw scores for all students 
in the school and then standardize the school-average state test scores because of the differences in the state test and 
the metric across grades, which are not necessarily comparable. Thus, the aggregated, school-average standardized 
(z-scored) test scores are not centered at zero, and tend to be slightly lower than zero. This discrepancy is likely due 
to the slight positive association between school size and achievement (with the exception of the negative 
associations in 2004 and 2005), and the increase in the number of small schools over the period. 
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 Table 3-1  
School Academic Characteristics for Closed Schools Three Years prior to Closure (Estimated Time of Announcement) 
 
School year 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-3 
Characteristics Closed: 
























 (n=9) (n=176) (n=8) (n=198) (n=3) (n=203) (n=3)b (n=202) (n=4)c (n=200) 
School-average ELA 
scores (mean) a 
-.631    -.051*** -.434 -.060† -.566 -.039 -.187 -.027 -.405 -.029 
School ELA standard 
deviation (mean)  
 .907 .888  .954 .885  .837  .882  .834  .881  .866  .874 
School-average math 
scores (mean) a 
-.630 -.038 -.427 -.065† -.513 -.040 -.150 -.039 -.391 -.024 
School math standard 
deviation (mean) 
 .924       .889**  .955 .877  .844  .876  .832  .870  .960  .880 
School-average days 
absent (mean) 
          
Fall n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 8.77 6.5 
Spring n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 10.3 8.4 10.5 8.3 
School-average days 
tardy 
          
Fall n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.3 11.1 
Spring n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 9.3 7.7 14.5 9.1† 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
a Measure is z-scored (M=0; SD=1) at the student level. 
b Student test scores, attendance, mobility, language and age data for JHS 142 Stranahan are not available for this school year.  




 School year 2003-4 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 
Characteristics Closed: last 
year is 2005-
6 
All other MS Closed: last 
year is 2006-
7 
All other MS Closed: last 
year is 2007-
8 
All other MS Closed: last 
year is 2008-
9 
All other MS 
 (n=10) (n=201) (n=6) (n=245) (n=5) (n=262) (n=8) (n=267) 
School-average ELA scores 
(mean) a 
-.422 -.025* -.477 -.049† -.470 -.089 -.479 -.079* 
School ELA standard deviation 
(mean) 
 .808  .868  .863  .835  .860  .848  .831  .840 
School-average math scores 
(mean) a 
-.341 -.017† -.501 -.038* -.561 -.098† -.531 -.097* 
School math standard deviation 
(mean) 
 .868  .874  .928  .831  .872  .835  .810  .817 
School-average days absent 
(mean) 
        
Fall  8.4 6.5  8.4 6.0  9.5 6.7  8.9  6.0** 
Spring 11.0 8.1 11.8 8.7 12.2 8.6 11.8 8.4* 
School-average days tardy         
Fall  9.6 6.7*  8.4 5.7  9.1 6.5 13.2      6.9*** 
Spring 12.6  8.6** 11.6 8.0 14.7 8.9* 14.1 8.9* 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
a Measure is z-scored (M=0; SD=1) at the student level. 
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  Figures 3-2 and 3-3 below display the school-average ELA test scores by year, for each 
closed school, to depict the tremendous variation in the school-average scores of closed schools.  
The figure suggests that, with a few exceptions, most schools' school-average ELA and math 
scores were consistently below the mean of other middle schools not selected for closure 
(marked by the heavy black line).  However, the spread of school-average achievement for 
closed schools varied by close to one-half standard deviation; the bulk of closed schools had 
school-average test scores between -0.25 and -0.75 standard deviations.  Only a few schools 
started out with high school-average test scores and descended rapidly in the years prior to 
closure, and in a few cases, school-average ELA and mathematics scores for the school improved 
prior to closure. (I discuss this trend later in the dissertation.)  
 
Figure 3-2. School-average ELA scores of closed schools, 1998-2008. a 











All other middle 
schools  




Figure 3-3.School-average mathematics scores of closed schools, 1998-2008. a 
a Measure is z-scored (M=0; SD=1) at the student level. 
 Some observers have posited that vocal objections to closures have increased over the 
past few years because the closed schools are no longer clearly the lowest-performing schools—
that is, that as the worst schools are closed, the schools closed in later rounds might be less 
clearly dysfunctional.  Schools closed earlier—between 1998 and 2001—had somewhat lower 
school-average ELA scores compared to schools closed later in the time period of this study; 
however, the same pattern was not evident with math scores.  Across both content areas, the 
smallest disparities in school-average achievement between closed schools and other schools, 
(<0.2 SD) occurred in 2001, and the largest gaps, approximately 0.6 standard deviations, evident 
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 of middle schools, suggesting few differences in the within-school variation of student test 
scores.  
 I also examined the demographic characteristics of closed schools compared to other 
middle schools (see Table 3-2).  Contrary to the perception of chronically underperforming 
schools as typically large, closed middle schools tended to enroll fewer students on average 
compared to other middle schools.  Schools closed in later years were slightly larger, on average, 
compared to schools closed in earlier years.  
 However, fitting with the stereotype associated with failing urban schools, closed middle 
schools served fewer White and Asian students than other middle schools.  In earlier years, 
closed schools tended to serve higher percentages of Hispanic students on average, compared to 
other schools, but in 2004 and later, this trend reversed, when middle schools selected for closure 
in these years began to serve fewer Hispanic students on average than other middle schools, and 
higher percentages of Black students.  Regarding home language, no clear pattern emerged 
between closed schools and other schools, with differences appearing to vary from year to year.  
However, from 2004 on, closed schools tended to serve lower percentages of students whose 
home language is not English.  And perhaps not surprisingly, middle schools selected for closure 
had slightly higher percentages of students eligible for free and reduced lunch than other types of 
middle schools. The percent of students eligible for free and reduced lunch was between five to 
twelve percentage points higher at closed schools than at other district schools.  Closed schools 
also had more mobile students. On average, schools selected for closure had higher percentages 
of students who have moved more than once in elementary school compared to other middle 
schools. 
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 Table 3-2 
School Demographic Characteristics Three Years Prior to Closure (Estimated Time of Announcement) 
 


























 (n=9) (n=176) (n=8) (n=198) (n=3) (n=203) (n=3)a (n=202) (n=4)b (n=200) 
Enrollment (mean) 767 1041 712 966 476 986 685 963 421 1009 
Racial composition 
(mean)           
Percent American 
Indian   0.3   0.2   0.3   0.3   0.2   0.2   0.5   0.3   0.7   0.3 
Percent Asian    1.3   9.9   2.6  9.2   2.6   9.7   7.8 10.1   1.6 10.3 
Percent Black 40.6 36.5 33.0 38.3 51.7 37.6 23.3 36.8 54.1 36.3 
Percent Hispanic 57.1  37.4† 56.6 38.0 44.0 38.3 47.6 39.0 41.6 39.7 
Percent White   0.8  16.0†   7.6 14.2   1.6 14.4 20.7 13.8   2.0 13.5 
Percent eligible for 
free/reduced lunch 
(mean) n/a n/a 90.3 78.9 52.0 76.5 92.0 82.9 n/a n/a 
Percent old for grade 
(mean) 31.2    17.6** 16.3 12.2 22.0 11.7 15.0 12.2 18.5 12.4 
Percent non-English 
household (mean)   8.7   5.1 12.2     7.1*   7.1   8.9 11.2 10.9   7.3 12.5 
Percent with 2 or more 
moves in elementary 
school (mean) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 55.5 48.2 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
a Student test scores, attendance, mobility, language and age data for JHS 142 Stranahan are not available for this school year.  




 School year 2003-4 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 
Characteristics Closed: last 
year is 2005-6 
All other MS Closed: last 
year is 2006-
7 






year is 2008-9 
All other 
MS 
 (n=10) (n=201) (n=6) (n=245) (n=5) (n=262) (n=8) (n=267) 
Enrollment (mean) 818 961 878 790 589 706 644 648 
Racial composition (mean)         
Percent American Indian   0.5   0.4   0.6   0.5   0.9   0.6   0.9   0.5 
Percent Asian    4.2 10.5   5.9   9.3   1.7   9.6   1.6 10.3 
Percent Black 48.1 35.5 53.3 37.3 61.4 37.1 62.4   36.5† 
Percent Hispanic 45.5 40.3 37.1 42.1 33.4 42.4 32.1 42.4 
Percent White   1.6 13.3   3.1 10.9   2.6 10.4   2.9 10.3 
Percent eligible for 
free/reduced lunch 
(mean) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
89.0 78.0 83.3 78.8 
Percent old for grade (mean) 19.9     12.6** 21.7   13.4* 22.7   13.5* 20.4   13.6* 
Percent non-English 
household (mean) 
18.0 13.2 13.7 14.3 11.3 15.2 11.4 17.6 
Percent with two or more 
moves in elementary 
school (mean) 
55.1 49.4 57.1 50.0 61.0 50.6 56.7 50.1 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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  This initial analysis of school demographics and achievement suggests that in the 
approximate year closure was announced, to-be-closed schools were performing quite poorly.  
My results indicate that three years prior to closure, to-be-closed schools had substantially lower-
performing students on average compared to other schools in the District.  With a few 
exceptions, the gaps in school-average academic characteristics between closed schools and 
other middle schools appear consistent for 1998-2008, and varied between 0.37 and 0.58 SDs, 
with a smaller 0.16 SD difference in 2001.  However, descriptions of the DOE policy for school 
closure suggest that the district administration reserves closure as a policy for schools that are 
chronically underperforming across multiple years.  The next set of analyses test this assertion 
by examining the academic performance of the to-be-closed schools across several years prior to 
closure.   
 Closed Schools and Chronic Low-Performance 
   Tables 3-3 and 3-4 display school-average ELA and mathematics test scores and school 
enrollment for the years prior to closure, by the schools' last year of operation.  In almost all 
years, schools slated to be closed evidence consistently low school-average test scores, generally 
between one-third to one-half standard deviation below average in both math and ELA several 
years prior to selection for closure.  One exception to this pattern are the schools closed in 2003, 
which tend to have higher school-average test scores compared to schools closed during other 
years, close to one-fifth to one-quarter standard deviation below average in the years prior to the 
closure announcement. This exception to the overall trend appears to be driven by the closure of 
one school, Brooklyn Community School.  Other schools closed this year are lower performing, 
consistent with the overall trend that suggests that closures were largely driven by accountability 
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 purposes rather than the declining enrollment and fiscal considerations that drive closures in 
other parts of the country.
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 Table 3-3  
Longitudinal Characteristics of Middle Schools by Year of Closure:  School-Average ELA Test Scores 
 
Last year of 
operation 
School-average ELA scores by year 
1997*** 1998*** 1999*** 2000*** 2001*** 2002*** 2003*** 2004*** 2005*** 2006*** 2007* 2008* 
Never 
Closed 
.070 .0670 .0448 .055 .065 .043 .035 -.001 -.056 -.068 -.087 -.122 
1998 -.739 -.794 Closed          
1999 -.387 -.507 -.493 Closed         
2000 -.619 -.631 -.597 -.544  Closed        
2001 -.362 -.429 -.434 -.417 -.394 Closed       
2002 -.391 -.459 -.472 -.566 -.513 -.395 Closed      
2003 -.156 -.236 -.222 -.209 -.187 -.207 -.319 Closed     
2004 -.460 -.384 -.126 -.033 -.341 -.405 -.398 -.429 Closed    
2005 -.252 -.342 -.367 -.393 -.376 -.429 -.422 -.408 -.361 Closed   
2006 -.295 -.327 -.319 -.324 -.417 -.400 -.438 -.477 -.570 -.461 Closed  
2007 -.378 -.408 -.345 -.385 -.366 -.479 -.534 -.501 -.470 -.479 -.350 Closed
2008 -.195 -.204 -.267 -.291 -.331 -.384 -.446 -.514 -.556 -.479 -.466 -.452 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
a Measure is z-scored (M=0; SD=1) at the student level. 
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 Table 3-4  
Longitudinal Characteristics of Middle Schools by Year of Closure:  School-Average Mathematics Test Scores 
 
Last year of 
operation 
School-average Math scores by year 
1998*** 1999*** 2000*** 2001*** 2002*** 2003*** 2004*** 2005*** 2006*** 2007* 2008† 
Never 
Closed 
.080 .041 .058 .058 .044 .039 .007 -.066 -.082 -.105 -.148 
1998 -.742 Closed          
1999 -.494 -.493 Closed         
2000 -.630 -.606 -.627 Closed        
2001 -.374 -.427 -.404 -.402 Closed       
2002 -.397 -.478 -.513 -.516 -.270 Closed      
2003 -.246 -.208 -.153 -.150 -.154 -.207 Closed     
2004 -.433 -.147 -.131 -.382 -.391 -.322 -.511 Closed    
2005 -.315 -.366 -.355 -.408 -.373 -.341 -.318 -.314 Closed   
2006 -.295 -.293 -.353 -.472 -.433 -.467 -.501 -.609 -.550 Closed  
2007 -.363 -.401 -.498 -.416 -.450 -.498 -.514 -.561 -.521 -.393 Closed
2008 -.329 -.329 -.328 -.360 -.375 -.415 -.488 -.562 -.531 -.499 -.393 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
a Measure is z-scored (M=0; SD=1) at the student level. 
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  Figure 3-4 displays mean differences between school-average ELA scores of closed 
schools and other middle schools by year of closure (represented by the zero line).  In most 
cases, closed schools displayed school-average ELA scores that are consistently lower than those 
of other middle schools in the years prior to closure.  For schools closed in all years but 2003, 
school-average ELA scores a few years prior to closure were between one-third to more than 
one-half standard deviation below other middle schools.  School-average mathematics scores 
reflect similar trends across all years, with the exception of schools closed in 2003, when school-
average mathematics gaps are closer to one-quarter standard deviation (see Figure3-5). 
 





































Figure 3-5. School-average mathematics test scores: Mean difference from schools never closed. 
 
 School-average test scores did not consistently descend in the years prior to closure. 
Figure 3-6 displays the mean growth (or drop) in school-average ELA and mathematics scores 
from the year prior; no clear pattern of growth or decline in school-average scores in the years 
prior to closure is apparent.  Moreover, in most years, on average, school-average ELA and 
mathematic scores rose the year or two prior closure, which is likely the phase-out period for 
many schools.  Similar trends were evident for mean differences in school-average mathematics 
test scores over time (see Figure 3-7).  This growth in test scores during phase-out is somewhat 
counterintuitive in that one might expect more able students to be the first to abandon the school 
during phase-out.  I discuss this unexpected pattern in more detail in the next chapter, which 


































   




Figure 3-7. School-average Mathematics scores: Mean difference from prior year. 
  
Differences in Enrollment Growth 
 The above findings suggest that with few exceptions, schools slated for closure tended to 
struggle with poor academic performance for several years prior to closure.  However, in 
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 enrollment as a secondary indicator to identify schools for closure.  Table 3-5 displays school 
enrollment across 1998-2008 by year of closure.  Excluding the estimated phase-out years, for 
which school enrollment declined necessarily as grades were eliminated, my results suggest that 
in the years prior to closure the average enrollment remains to decline slightly, with the 
exception of schools closed in 2002, for which enrollment appears relatively constant.  Note that 
average enrollment for other middle schools was also lower in later years of the study. However, 
unlike the closed schools, other middle schools did not appear to lose enrollment.  Figure 3-8 
displays the mean growth (or drop) in enrollment from the year prior, by year of closure (see also 
Table 3-6; approximate phase-out years are not displayed). 
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 Table 3-5  





Average Enrollment by year 
1997*** 1998*** 1999* 2000*** 2001*** 2002 2003*** 2004 2005† 2006* 2007** 2008*** 
Never 
Closed 
1119 1121 1038 1035 1024 1044 997 810 718 660 603 598 
1998 346 326 Closed          
1999 637 565 404 Closed         
2000 808 767 534 293 Closed        
2001 728 769 712 696 517 Closed       
2002 472 476 477 476 332 155 Closed      
2003 440 743 879 1159 685 690 348 Closed     
2004 1019 970 780 772 415 421 365 149 Closed    
2005 1072 1017 839 856 848 857 818 540 255 Closed   
2006 990 984 983 959 939 974 947 878 563 248 Closed  
2007 939 955 807 744 721 707 703 684 589 362 201 Closed
2008 785 843 874 886 830 895 882 834 752 644 394 184 




























 Table 3-6 
Mean Growth in Enrollment from Prior Year, by Year of Closure 
 
Last year of 
operation 
 
1998*** 1999*** 2000*** 2001*** 2002* 2003** 2004*** 2005*** 2006*** 2007*** 2008* 
Never Closed 10 24 41 0 37 -15 -40 -33 -26 -14 -8 
1998 -20 Closed          
1999 -72 -161 Closed         
2000 -40 -234 -241 Closed        
2001 42 -58 -15 -179 Closed       
2002 3 2 -1 -144 -177 Closed      
2003 304 135 280 -474 5 -342 Closed     
2004 -49 -190 -8 -291 37 -56 -217 Closed    
2005 -54 -31 17 -8 10 -40 -278 -286 Closed   
2006 -5 -2 -24 -21 35 -27 -69 -314 -315 Closed  
2007 16 52 64 -24 -13 -4 -19 -94 -227 -161 Closed
2008 59 30 11 -47 65 -13 -48 -83 -108 -250 -210 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
 





















   
Academic Characteristics of Students Who Attend Closed Schools prior to Enrollment 
 My findings thus far indicate that schools slated to be closed struggled academically for 
several years prior to closure.  They also tended to experience small declines in enrollment.  It is 
not clear, however, whether the association between closed schools and low average student 
performance was caused by the schools, or merely a reflection of the types of students that the 
to-be-closed schools initially enroll.  A central criticism of closure policies is that schools 
identified for closure serve students who enter with greater needs and lower academic 
achievement than students in other schools.  In this section I examine whether closed schools 
enrolled students who were more disadvantaged from the start, compared to other schools.   
 State test scores. Table 3-7 displays the school-average entering ELA scores for students 
entering the school by year of closure (e.g. fifth-grade scores for entering sixth graders for 6-8 
middle schools; sixth-grade scores for entering seventh graders in 7-8 or 7-9 junior high 
schools).  Not included in this table are entering scores for schools that are in the phase-out 
process (though very few enroll new students).  Similar to school-average ELA scores while 
enrolled in the closed schools, from the start, these schools enrolled students who score 
significantly lower on average than students entering other middle schools.  This disparity was 
true for both ELA and mathematics (see Table 3-8).  The differences between school-average 
entering scores were similar to differences in school-average scores while enrolled.  Average 
ELA scores for students entering to-be-closed schools were between 0.2 to 0.6 standard 
deviations below those of other schools.  For the few years prior to closure, the gap was 
somewhat larger on average—between 0.3 to 0.6 standard deviations.  The same trends were 
apparent in mathematics, although the largest gaps were closer to 0.5 standard deviations rather 
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 than the 0.6 SD found with ELA scores.  Across the entire decade of this study, these closed 
schools appear to have enrolled students who are at a significant disadvantage from the start, 
compared to other middle schools, particularly in the years prior to phase-out.  
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 Table 3-7  
Mean School-Average ELA Scores for Entering Studentsa,b 
 
Last year of 
operation 






























.167 .115 .148 .138 .113 .063 .018 -.035 -.062 
1998 -.824         
1999          
2000 -.375 -.326        
2001 -.334 -.310 -.415       
2002 -.237 -.308 -.356 -.027      
2003 -.327 -.213 -.232 -.295      
2004 -.524 -.121 -.068 -.302 -.307 -.204    
2005 -.103 -.205 -.132 -.300 -.167 -.398    
2006 -.146 -.204 -.232 -.282 -.279 -.375 -.416 .188  
2007 -.338 -.204 -.235 -.272 -.321 -.467 -.394 -.465 -.511 
2008 -.073 -.098 -.143 -.251 -.361 -.300 -.433 -.405 -.427 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
aBlank cells indicate either the schools are phasing out or are no longer in operation. 
b Measure is z-scored (M=0; SD=1) at the student level.
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 Table 3-8 
Mean School-Average Mathematics Scores for Entering Studentsa,b 
 
Last year of 
operation 




1999 (for 2000 
entrants )** 
2000 (for 2001 
entrants) † 
2001 (for 2002 
entrants)** 
2002 (for 2003 
entrants)* 
2003 (for 2004 
entrants)** 
2004 (for 2005 
entrants)* 
2005 (for 2006 
entrants)† 
Never Closed .123 .151 .106 .116 .078 .026 -.012 -.052 
1998         
1999         
2000 -.485        
2001 -.326 -.370       
2002 -.336 -.359 .094      
2003 -.267 -.267 -.171      
2004 -.131 -.112 -.380 -.304 -.124    
2005 -.204 -.174 -.277 -.159 -.317    
2006 -.209 -.218 -.301 -.319 -.292 -.419 .325  
2007 -.246 -.244 -.251 -.332 -.394 -.309 -.374 -.460 
2008 -.132 -.183 -.237 -.318 -.300 -.377 -.324 -.519 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
aBlank cells indicate either the schools are phasing out or are no longer in operation. 
b Measure is z-scored (M=0; SD=1) at the student level.
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  Attendance rates.  Similar disparities were evident in other academic characteristics.  
Tables 3-9 and 3-10 display mean school-average entering students' attendance rates by year of 
closure.  With the exception of 2004 absence data for schools closed in 2006, average entering 
students' prior year absences were between one to five days greater in closed schools compared 
to other middle schools.  Moreover, the gap in mean school-average absences between closed 
schools and other middle schools tended to increase in the few years prior to phase-out, 
suggesting that just prior to identification of a school for closure, schools tended to enroll more 
students with weaker prior attendance records.  One exception to this trend are the schools closed 
in 2006, for which the gap in absences reversed closer to phase-out.  Finally, schools closed in 
later years—2007 and 2008—had higher rates of absences and wider gaps between closed and 
other schools, compared to schools closed in earlier years.   
 Schools selected for closure also enrolled students who were more likely to be late to 
school in the years prior to entering the middle school (see Table 3-10).  Mean school-average 
tardy rates for first year students in the year prior to enrollment were higher at closed schools by 
one to three days, compared to other middle schools.  Additionally, in contrast to absences rates, 
most closed schools enrolled students with slightly lower rates of prior-year tardies in the year 
before phase-out. Differences across cohorts of closed schools were minimal.  
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 Table 3-9 
Mean School-Average Entering Students'  Prior Year Absencesa 
 
Last year of 
operation 




2002 (for 2003 entrants) 2003 (for 2004 entrants) 2004 (for 2005 entrants) 2005 (for 2006 entrants) 
 Spring Fall Spring** Fall† Spring** Fall Spring Fall** Spring*** 
Never 
Closed 
6.24 4.66 6.22 4.70 5.80 4.70 6.69 4.85 6.43 
2004 8.64 6.61 8.52       
2005 7.45 5.70 7.32       
2006 8.03 6.11 7.42 7.01 8.85 3.61 5.63   
2007 8.50 6.75 9.35 6.49 8.06 6.31 9.50 8.64 11.38 
2008 8.04 5.57 7.38 6.22 7.85 5.59 8.23 6.58  8.93 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
aData are not available for attendance prior to spring, 2001. Blank cells indicate either the schools are phasing out or are no longer in operation. 
 
Table 3-10 
Mean School-Average Entering Students' Prior Year Tardiesa 
 
Last year of 
operation 




2002 (for 2003 entrants) 2003 (for 2004 entrants) 2004 (for 2005 entrants) 2005 (for 2006 entrants) 
 Spring Fall*** Spring*** Fall*** Spring*** Fall* Spring** Fall Spring*** 
Never Closed 3.43 4.24 4.30 3.98 4.41 3.55 4.30 4.09 4.75 
2004 6.11 6.33 6.90       
2005 5.38 6.18 6.31       
2006 4.97 6.58 6.68 5.36 6.81 2.18 2.78   
2007 5.44 7.68 8.15 5.19 5.81 5.26 7.41 10.17 17.79 
2008 5.50 5.03 5.83 5.16 5.46 4.87 5.62   5.25   6.25 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 




 Reconstituted Schools  
 New York City’s approach to school closure usually involves creating and growing new 
schools in a building whose closing schools are phasing-out.  I define these reconstituted schools 
those schools that either open newly in or move to the building housing the to-be-closed school 
when the closure is announced or in any future years following closure, and that serve sixth, 
seventh and/or eighth grade students. In several cases the closed schools had been sharing a 
school building with one or more schools for several years prior to the closure announcement. I 
did not categorize these pre-existing schools as reconstituting the closed schools. Additionally, I 
did not categorize as reconstituted any schools that moved to the building for only one year--only 
those that remained in the building for two or more years.   
 Within the same building, 134 schools replaced the 66 closed schools (see Table 6).  The 
grade ranges reported here are the range of the school when first fully phased-in to the 
building—across the years, some of these schools expanded or contracted their grade spans.   
 Just over half (58%) of the newly reconstituted schools were middle or junior high 
schools (see Table 3-11).  Another one-fifth of the reconstituted schools served middle-school-
age students, with grade configurations of K-8, 6-12 and in one case, K-12.  The other 20 percent 
of reconstituted schools included high and elementary schools, and one school that served only 
special education students. 
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 Table 3-11 
Grade Spans of Reconstituted Schools 
 








Ungraded (special ed)  1
TOTAL  132
 
 As displayed in Table 3-12, the majority of the schools that replaced the closed schools 
were traditional public schools.  Charter schools did not begin moving into the buildings of 
closed middle schools until 2005; just under 10 percent of schools that replaced the closed 
schools were charter schools.  Approximately twelve percent of the schools that moved into the 
buildings of the closed schools were not new schools, but rather had been incubated for a few 
years in another building, or in a few cases, were established over ten years or more prior to 
moving to the building.  Additionally, many of the closed schools were already sharing their 
building space with other schools, and these remaining pre-established schools are not included 
in this count of reconstituted schools.  
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 Table 3-12  










1995  2  
1996    
1997  4  
1998   1
1999  13  
2000  8  
2001  11  
2002  9  
2003  4  
2004  15  
2005 2 13  
2006 2 12  
2007 1 15  
2008 3 9  
2009 1 5  
2010 3   
TOTAL 12 120 1
  
 One contention against school closure and reconstitution is that the new schools do not 
serve the same students that the closed schools served, and specifically, that the new schools 
select higher-performing students with lower academic needs.  In the following section, I 
examine whether the reconstituted middle schools serve different types of students than the 
schools that were closed.  
 Reconstituted schools: Academic characteristics of entering students. Table 3-13 
displays the mean school-average ELA and math scores for entering students in schools that 
were closed, compared to the new schools that reconstituted or replaced the closed schools.  The 
table reports school-average scores for entering students two years prior to closure, which is 
approximately just prior to the closure announcement.  For the reconstituted schools, the school-
average entering scores were for the schools' first year of operation, usually one to two years 
after the closure announcement, and in two cases, three and six years later.  
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  Similar to the schools selected for closure, school-average entering academic 
achievement characteristics at reconstituted schools were substantially lower than average.  State 
test score differences between reconstituted and closed schools they replaced varied by year.  For 
schools closed in 2000 through 2002—the years prior to the Bloomberg/Klein administration—
reconstituted schools appear to have served equally or very slightly lower-achieving students.  In 
later years, for schools closed in 2003 on, the reconstituted schools served slightly more 
advantaged, higher-achieving students compared to students who enrolled in the closed schools: 
for these years, school-average entering ELA and mathematics scores in the reconstituted 
schools were between .12 to .4 SD higher than their closed school counterparts, on average.     
Table 3-13 
Reconstituted Schools versus Schools Selected for Closure: School-Average Entering Student 
Test Scores 
 
 Entering (prior year) ELA scores a, b Entering (prior year) mathematics 
scores a, b 
Year of closure Closed Reconstituted Closed  Reconstituted 
2000 
(ns = 9c, 10r) 
-.375 -.446 n/a n/a 
2001 
(n = 7c, 10r) 
-.304 -.326 -.314 -.260 
2002  
(n = 3c, 3r) 
-.356 -.320 -.359 -.352 
2003 
(n= 3c, 4r) 
-.395 -.170 -.384 -.265 
2004 
(n = 4c, 5r) 
-.307 .017 -.304 -.095 
2005 
(n = 10c, 14r) 
-.398 -.221 -.317 -.173 
2006  
(n = 6c, 13r) 
-.416 -.291 -.419 -.302 
2007  
(n = 5c, 7r) 
 -.465* -.074 -.374† -.063 
2008 
(n = 8c, 13r) 
  -.426** -.242 -.519 -.302 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
a Measure is z-scored (M=0; SD=1) at the student level. 
b For closed schools, school-average scores are for entering students two years prior to closure. For 




  I find similar patterns with student academic behavior.  Data are only available for schools 
closed in 2004 and later.  Similar to patterns for entering academic achievement for schools closed 
after 2003, reconstituted schools enrolled student with fewer academic behavior problems compared to 
the closed schools they replaced (see Table 3-14).  Specifically, reconstituted schools enrolled students 
who enter with slightly lower school-average absences in the prior year compared to schools selected 
for closure, on average.  The differences in school-average entering absence rates were consistently 
lower in reconstituted schools, from .97 to 2.44 days depending on the year of closure.  The pattern 
was similar for school-average tardiness of entering students: school-average prior year tardiness rates 
of entering students were between .3 to 1.57 incidences lower at the reconstituted schools, compared 
to the closed schools that they replaced. 
Table 3-14  
Reconstituted Schools versus Schools Selected for Closure: Entering Student Attendance Ratesa,b 
 
 Prior spring school-average absences for 
entering students (mean) 
Prior spring school-average tardies for 
entering students(mean) 
Year of closure Selected for 
closure 
Reconstituted Selected for closure  Reconstituted 
2004 
(n = 4c, 5r) 
  8.64† 6.31 6.11 4.75 
2005 
(n = 10c, 14r) 
  7.32† 6.35 6.31 4.99 
2006  
(n = 6c, 13r) 
8.85 7.84 6.81 5.98 
2007  
(n = 5c, 7r) 
  9.50† 7.06 7.41 5.84 
2008 
(n = 8c, 13r) 
8.93 7.58 6.25 5.95 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
a Data are not available for attendance prior to spring, 2001.  
b For closed schools, school-average attendance rates are for entering students two years prior to closure. For 
reconstituted schools, the school-average entering attendance rates are for the entering students in schools' first 
year of operation. 
 
 Reconstituted schools: Student demographics. Table 3-15 displays the demographic 
characteristics of reconstituted and closed schools by school year.  Similar to differences in 
school-average achievement between reconstituted and closed schools, reconstituted schools 
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 tended to serve a slightly lower percentages of students who are old for the grade, on average.  
Differences between reconstituted and closed schools ranged between three to eleven percentage 
points.  There were two exceptions to this trend: for schools closed in 2001 through 2003, 
reconstituted schools served similar percentages of students who were old for their grade.  With 
the exception of schools closed in 2006, reconstituted schools also served similar or very slightly 
lower percentages of mobile students on average compared to schools selected for closure, as 
measured by the number of moves a student made in elementary school. 
 No clear pattern emerged regarding student race and ethnicity, and across most years of 
closure, there appears to be very little displacement of students in terms of racial and ethnic 
background, with two exceptions.  Reconstituted schools that replaced schools closed in 2003 
served substantially higher percentages of black students and smaller percentages of white 
students than their closed counterparts, on average.  For schools closed in 2003, average school 
racial composition was approximately one-quarter Black and one-quarter white.  In contrast, the 
reconstituted schools were comprised of almost no white students (2.7%) and more than two-
fifths (44%) black students. This change appears to have been driven by the closure of one 
school, Brooklyn Community School.  Second, reconstituted schools that replaced schools closed 
in 2005 served slightly fewer black students and slightly more Hispanic students.  Similarly, I 
find no clear relationship between reconstitution and home language, suggesting that 
reconstituted schools and the closed schools they replaced served similar percentages of English 
language learner students. 
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 Table 3-15 
Reconstituted Schools versus Schools Ever Selected for Closure: Demographic Characteristics by School Year 
 a 
Year of Closure 2000 2001 2002 2003 




















         
Racial composition (mean)         
Percent American Indian   0.3   0.2   0.2   0.5   0.2   0.8    0.4*   0.9 
Percent Asian    1.3   1.2   3.0   1.1   2.6   1.4   8.3   1.7 
Percent Black 40.6 42.9 34.9 35.8 51.6 51.1 25.8 44.1 
Percent Hispanic 57.1 55.4 53.3 61.1 44.0 45.8 44.0 50.5 
Percent White     0.8*   0.4   8.6   1.4   1.6   0.9 21.4   2.7 
Percent eligible for 
free/reduced lunch (mean) 
n/a n/a 89.3 70.7 52.0 n/a 88.6 n/a 
Percent old for grade (mean)  31.2* 20.1 16.4 17.7 22.0 18.5 13.1 16.1 
Percent non-English 
household (mean) 
  8.7† 15.2 11.5 19.9   7.1   9.2   8.3   6.7 
Percent with three or more 
moves in elementary 
school (mean) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 

































          
Percent American 
Indian 
  0.7   0.7   0.5   0.4   0.6   0.7   0.9   0.4   0.9   0.5 
Percent Asian    1.6   2.9   4.2   4.1   5.9   4.7   1.7   3.6   1.6   1.4 
Percent Black 54.1 52.4 48.1 35.7 53.2 60.6 61.4 53.7 62.4 64.9 
Percent Hispanic 41.6 40.0 45.5 55.5 37.1 31.3 33.4 38.2 32.1 29.7 
Percent White   2.0   4.0   1.6   4.4   3.1   2.7   2.6   4.1   2.9   3.5 
Percent eligible for 
free/reduced lunch 
(mean) 
n/a 22.3 n/a 43.4 n/a 84.1 89.0 51.9 83.3 78.3 
Percent old for grade 
(mean) 
18.5 12.4 19.9 17.0 21.7 17.5 22.7 17.4 20.4 16.8 
Percent non-English 
household (mean) 
  7.3   8.6 18.0 19.9 13.7   8.8 11.3 14.7 11.4   9.8 
Percent with 3 or 
more moves in 
elementary school 
(mean) 
30.6 30.5 28.7 26.8 30.9 32.5 35.8 28.5 29.6 24.4 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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 Closed and Reconstituted Schools Discussion 
 This description of closure and reconstitution in New York City from 1998-2008 
provides some clarity regarding the characteristics of schools selected for closure and the actual 
implementation of closure and reconstitution.  The findings here also provide some initial 
insights regarding the impact of closure on students.  Proponents of school closure contend that 
the schools selected for closure are chronically underperforming and impenetrable to 
improvement.  Critics of schools closure protest that the selection of schools is biased or 
politically motivated rather than based on a more objective rationale.  My results suggest that 
descriptively the schools selected for closure did perform significantly worse than other middle 
schools on state assessments for multiple years prior to closure.  Average absence and tardy rates 
were also higher in schools selected for closure compared to other middle schools.  Additionally, 
these schools experienced small declines in enrollment over several years prior to closure, 
perhaps one market indicator of declining quality.  Thus, it seems clear that schools selected for 
closure had significantly lower academic achievement, although there is enough variation in the 
school-average test scores to suggest the city does not base decisions solely on test scores.  As 
such, the implementation of the closure policy may leave room for some political maneuverings, 
as some critics of closure charge.  Relatively high-performing schools were closed in only a few 
cases, indicative that schools in New York City were closed mainly for accountability purposes 
and not solely for fiscal considerations as in many other school districts.    
 A second criticism of closure posits that the policy is racist in its targeting of schools in 
neighborhoods with high minority concentrations.  The middle schools selected for closure did 
indeed serve a significantly higher percentage of Hispanic or Black students, compared to other 
middle schools: in earlier years, higher percentages of Hispanic students than other schools, and 
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 in later years, higher percentages of Black students than in other schools.  Charges of racist 
policies must confront the strong associations between school demographics and student 
achievement.  In short, closing low-performing schools will result in closure of high-minority 
schools.  I discuss these troubling associations later in this dissertation.  
   Closed schools also, not surprisingly given the long-documented links between poverty 
and school achievement, served higher percentages of poor students, as measured by free and 
reduced lunch eligibility.  These schools also served higher percentages of mobile students and 
old-for-grade students, compared to other district middle schools.  These findings point to the 
argument that closed schools perform poorly partly because they are serving some of the most 
vulnerable students in the District.  Examination of the entering characteristics of first year 
students in closed schools compared to other middle schools provide evidence to support this 
argument.  The mean gap in initial ELA and mathematics ability between closed and other 
schools was similar in magnitude to the gap between subsequent school-average scores.  
Furthermore, average entering students' prior year absences were greater in closed schools, and 
this difference is greatest in the period when the schools are identified for closure.  Thus, these 
closed schools faced enormous challenges from the start in the enrollment and concentration of 
students with great academic need compared to other district schools. 
  Critics of the reconstitution element of the closure process also contend that any 
advantage reconstituted schools evidence after their counterparts close are due to the fact that the 
newly reconstituted schools replacing the closed schools tend to enroll more advantaged 
students.  My results suggest that this assertion is at least partially true.  The academic 
differences between the students who enroll in reconstituted schools compared the closed schools 
that they replaced are striking, particularly in later years.  In 2004 and later, reconstituted schools 
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 enrolled higher performing students, as measured by state test scores.  Additionally, reconstituted 
schools enrolled students with fewer absences and tardiness in the year prior to enrolling, 
compared to the closed schools they replaced, suggesting that reconstituted schools enrolled 
students with slightly greater motivation, more supportive families or other social supports.  
Reconstituted schools also tended to serve slightly lower percentages of students who were old 
for the grade.  In contrast, reconstituted schools were composed of relatively similar percentages 
of students who are mobile prior to entering middle school and who were eligible for 
free/reduced lunch, providing some evidence that the district was not particularly successful in 
altering the concentrations of poor students within the schools.  Similarly, with few exceptions, 
reconstituted schools appear to have served similar types of students that the closed schools 
served in terms of race/ethnicity and home language.  
 These findings lend some credence to the argument that closure displaces students 
because in some respects the new schools are not serving the students and families who would 
have attended the closed school, although the changes in the academic composition of the 
student body may be purposeful on the part of the district in its stated goal to interrupt attendance 
patterns to lessen the high concentrations of low-achieving students.  From a policy perspective, 
the District is faced with two conflicting choices: it can ensure that the reconstituted schools 
serve the same types of students as the closed schools they replace, reflective of the communities 
in which they are located, or the district can disrupt attendance patterns and create less 
academically and socio-economically segregated schools at the expense of no longer serving all 
students in the school community. I return to this policy dilemma later in this dissertation. 
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 Chapter 4: Phase-Out Process 
 
 As stated earlier in this dissertation, New York City's approach to closure is somewhat 
exceptional in that it does not close a “failing” school and immediately open another.  Rather, 
schools are phased out and phased in over several years. For example, once a school is identified 
for closure, the school will cease admitting new students that next fall, but allow currently 
enrolled students to continue, closing once the last group admitted of students has graduated. 
This next chapter examines how the city has implemented closure from 1998-2008, the 
characteristics of students as schools phase-out, and student mobility during the process.  
 Although these students represent quite a small percentage of New York City students, I 
believe the process is important to examine for two reasons. First, these are some of the most 
vulnerable and underserved students and thus warrant closer study. Second, a better 
understanding of student mobility during phase-out might provide some insight into the potential 
disruptions associated with school closure. Such information is important to my second research 
question regarding the impact of closure.  
Implementation  
 Implementation of the closure process appears to vary across administrations, and in 
some cases, across schools.  Of the 66 schools that closed, 13 did not go through a phase-out 
process two or three years prior to closure (see Table 4-1).  In a few other cases, a school phased-
out over a single year.  For example, three middle schools that closed in 2001 appeared to 
implement only one year of phasing-out, leaving seventh graders without a school for eighth 
grade.  Another fifth-eighth grade school dropped its fifth graders (who would have moved to 
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 sixth grade in the final year), and sixth graders (who would have moved to seventh grade in its 
final year), retaining only the seventh graders, who moved up to eighth grade.   
Table 4-1 
Type of Closure Process 
Last year of 
operation 
Phased-out Partially Phased-
out (some but not 
all grades) 




1999-00 2  2 4 
2000-01 8  1 9 
2001-02  4 4 8 
2002-03 2 1  3 
2003-04 1  2 3 
2004-05 4  1 5 
2005-06 9  1 10 
2006-07 5  1 6 
2007-08 4  1 5 
2008-09 8  0 8 
Total    64 
 
School Characteristics During Phase-Out  
 Table 4-2 displays the characteristics of schools as they went through the phase out 
process.  Not unexpectedly, as schools phase-out grades, enrollment declined significantly.  
However, somewhat surprisingly, given that we would expect a negative impact of phase-out on 
achievement, the mean gap in school-average test scores between closing schools and all other 
schools appears relatively consistent, at approximately one-half standard deviation below the 
mean of other middle schools, across most years.  School absence and tardy rates were also 
similar across most years, although schools experienced a very small rise in both absences and 
tardies in the fourth through second years prior to closure.  School demographic characteristics 
appear to change as well: as schools approached closure, the percentage of students eligible for 
free and reduced lunch increased.  Additionally, schools that were phasing out served primarily 
Black and Hispanic students—my findings suggest that very few White or Asian students 
experienced this process.  
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 Table 4-2  
School Phase-Out Process 
 












Last year of 
operation 
Enrollment (mean) 799 787 689 502 284 
School-average ELA scores a difference 
from mean of all other middle schools 
(mean) 
-.485 -.523 -.558 -.558 -.530 
School-average math scoresa difference 
mean of from all other middle schools 
(mean) 
-.486 -.503 -.550 -.544 -.536 
School-average days absent (mean)      
Fall   8.3   8.7   8.7   9.0   8.4 
Spring 10.7 11.5 11.4 11.1 10.8 
School-average days tardy (mean)      
Fall   8.5   9.1 10.4 10.8 10.6 
Spring 11.6 13.5 13.1 13.2 11.1 
Racial composition (mean)      
Percent American Indian   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.51 
Percent Asian    3.2   3.0   3.1   3.2   3.71 
Percent Black 49.3 48.3 47.5 46.9 46.20 
Percent Hispanic 41.1 44.1 44.9 45.5 45.73 
Percent White   5.8   4.2   4.0   3.9   3.87 
Percent eligible for free/reduced lunch 
(mean) 
59.3 66.7 68.2 69.8 82.54 
Percent non-English household (mean)   9.3   9.8 11.4 12.3 14.0 
a Measure is z-scored (M=0; SD=1) at the student level. 
 
Student Characteristics During Phase-Out   
In my next set of analyses, I describe the characteristics of the students who attend the 
schools as they are phasing out, and focus on questions related to student mobility, including the 
extent to which students withdraw from the phasing-out school, how the characteristics of 
students who remain differ from to those who leave and enroll in other schools, and how the 
characteristics of these alternate schools to which students depart differ from the phasing-out 
schools.  For these analyses, I exclude students enrolled in the 13 schools that did not phase-out 
prior to closure.  Table 4-3 displays the percentage of students in grade five through eight that 
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 experience closure and phase-out.5 In any year, a very small percentage of students—between 
two and three percent of all middle school-age students—were attending middle schools that are 
in the process of closing. 
                                                 
5 I am not able to include any data on phase-out and mobility between 8th and 9th grade for the junior high school 
that phased out and served 9th graders because I do not have 9th grade data for students in earlier years. 
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 Table 4-3  














Other school (%) 97.4 96.5 97.4 98.2 99.4 97.1 
Estimated year of announcement (%) 1.9 1.8 .4 .4 .1 2.7 
First year of phase-out (%) .7 1.2 1.5 .2 .4 .0 










Other school (%) 97.0 97.5 97.5 98.8 
Estimated year of announcement 
(%) 
1.4 1.0 1.5 n/a 
First year of phase-out (%) 1.6 .8 .6 .9 




  Table 4-4 displays student mobility in schools that were not closed compared to schools 
that were closed, for middle-grade (5-8) students.  Specifically, I examine the percentage of 
students who were enrolled in a school during the estimated year of announcement of closure 
and subsequently left the school during the phase-out process.  I exclude from these mobility 
rates those students who left due to having reached the end of the grade configuration of the 
school.  Although mobility rates differ significantly by phase-out status (p<.001), the relationship 
between phase-out and mobility was not consistent across years.  In some years—1999, 2001, 
and 2002—mobility was considerably higher in schools phasing out.  For example, in 1999, 
more than one-quarter (27.3%) of students attending schools in the year of announcement moved 
to a different school at some point during the phase-out, compared to one-fifth (20.4%) of 
students attending schools that were not phasing-out or about to phase-out.  In contrast, in other 
years—2003 and later—mobility rates were the same or lower in schools phasing-out. 
Table 4-4  
Student Mobility by Closure Status 
 
School year Percentage of students who moved schools in the subsequent year 
 Not closing Estimated year of 
announcement
First year of phase-
out
Second year of 
phase-out
1998 21.7%*** 13.8% 10.2% n/a
1999 20.4%*** 13.3%   7.5%   7.5%
2000 19.1%*** 14.8% 12.2%   5.7%
2001 18.8%*** 31.9% 12.0% 45.7%
2002 18.5%*** 15.1% 30.3% 28.1%
2003 20.5%*** 11.7%   3.1% .0%
2004 19.7%***   6.9% 10.3%   4.5%
2005 18.6%***   8.4%   6.2%   9.6%
2006 18.4%*** 13.1%   7.7%   1.6%
2007 20.6%*** n/a 16.1%   1.9%
 
 Years with particularly high mobility rates during the phase-out process—approximately 
one-third and larger—are usually because one school dropped a grade completely while closing. 
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 For example, note the particularly high mobility rate (31.9%) for schools in the year of 
announcement in 2001 and subsequently, the first year of phase-out in 2002 (30.3%).  One 
school phasing-out during these year enrolled sixth through ninth graders in the estimated year of 
announcement, sixth through eighth graders in the first year of phase-out, and only eighth 
graders in the year prior to closure.  Thus, all eighth (and graduating ninth) graders moved to a 
new school following the year of announcement, and all sixth graders moved to a new school 
following the first year of the phase-out.  Similarly, the schools in the second (and last) year of 
phase-out in 2001 enrolled both 7th and 8th graders, thus the following year all seventh graders 
were required to move to new schools. 
 Students leaving closing schools moved to schools with higher average achievement 
scores and fewer attendance problems, on average.  Table 4-5 displays the characteristics of the 
phasing out schools compared to the schools that receive students from these schools the next 
year.  Characteristics for both schools are in the estimated year of closure announcement.  With 
the exception of 2001, across all years the schools that students moved to had higher school-
average ELA and mathematics scores; receiving schools had school-average ELA and 
mathematics scores that were 0.2 to 0.5 SDs higher, on average, than those of the closing 
schools.  The schools that students moved to also had significantly lower average tardy rates; 
school-average tardy rates for closed schools were between three to six days higher in closed 
schools across the years of this study.  School-average absence rates in 2001 and 2002 were 
slightly higher at receiving schools, on average, but in 2003 and later, school-average absence 
rates at closed schools were between one-half to two days higher compared to receiving schools. 
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 Table 4-5 
School Academic Characteristics of Phasing Out and Receiving Schools 
School year 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-3 


















 (n=7) (n=105) (n=9) (n=110) (n=2) (n=195) (n=3) (n=91)a (n=1) c (n=52) 
School-average 
ELA scores a 
(mean) 





 .919  .903 .912  .894 .911  .896  .807  .875  .857  .802 
School-average 
math scores a 
(mean) 









          
Fall n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   8.7   9.22 
Spring n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 10.1 13.1 10.7 11.1 
School-average 
days tardy 
          
Fall n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 11.6   6.7 
Spring n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 11.6   8.0 14.0   8.0 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
a Measure is z-scored (M=0; SD=1) at the student level. 
b Student test scores, attendance, mobility, language and age data for JHS 142 Stranahan are not available.  
c Data for JHS 17 LaSalle School are not available. 
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 (n=13) (n=149) (n=5) (n=169) (n=5) (n=142) (n=5) (n=149) 
School-average ELA scores a 
(mean) 
-.416* -.184 -.603* -.257 -.470 -.311 -.489† -.166 
School ELA standard deviation 
(mean) 
.827 .861 .865 .833 .859 .852 .811 .837 
School-average math scores a 
(mean) 
-.343† -.146 -.635* -.239 -.561 -.316 -.527† -.227 
School math standard deviation 
(mean) 
.884 .882 .951 .863 .872 .851 .787 .832 
School-average days absent 
(mean) 
        
Fall   8.6 8.0   8.9   7.8   9.5   9.7   8.6 7.2 
Spring 10.7 9.7 12.4 10.7 12.2 11.6 11.2 9.7 
School-average days tardy         
Fall 10.4* 6.8   9.4*   5.9   9.1   6.4 13.6** 7.9 
Spring  13.5*** 8.5 12.8*   8.1   14.7*   8.6 15.3* 9.8 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 




  With respect to demographic characteristics during the phase-out process, the schools that 
students from closing schools move to served a population of students that is less disadvantaged 
and less segregated.  Receiving schools were larger than the closing schools, by between 100 to 
800 students, on average (this difference in size is not due to phase-out; characteristics for both 
schools were in the estimated year of closure announcement; see Table 4-6).  Additionally the 
racial/ethnic composition of the student body of the receiving schools was slightly less 
segregated with lower concentrations of any one ethnic group.  The same was true for poverty. 
With the exception of the 2000 school year, receiving schools tended to have slightly lower 
proportions (5-10%) of students eligible for free or reduced lunch, on average.  The receiving 
schools also had lower percentages of students who were old for their grade and lower 
percentages of students with high rates of mobility prior to entering middle school.  This pattern 
is similar to the closure-reconstitution process in which the non-closure schools enrolled higher-














 Table 4-6 
School Demographic Characteristics of Phasing Out and Receiving Schools 
 
School year 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-3 
Characteristics Closed: 




























 (n=7) (n=105) (n=9) (n=110) (n=2) (n=195) (n=3) (n=91)a (n=1) c (n=52) 
Enrollment (mean) 845 1055 658* 1068 641 1102 498 1352 292 1106 
Racial composition 
(mean) 
          
Percent American 
Indian 
  0.3   0.3   0.3   0.3   0.2   0.3   0.3   0.3   1.0   0.4 
Percent Asian    1.5   5.8   2.4   6.9   0.1   4.5   7.4   5.6   3.4   8.7 
Percent Black 39.8 43.9 35.8 43.9 61.5 47.9 26.2 38.5 50.0 38.3 
Percent Hispanic 57.7 43.4 54.6 41.0 37.4 42.1 47.8 50.7 40.1 43.5 
Percent White     0.8***   6.7   6.8   8.0   6.9   5.2 18.2   4.9   5.5   9.2 
Percent eligible for 
free/reduced lunch 
(mean) 
n/a n/a   94.8* 
82.9 44.6 79.7 89.4 83.9 n/a n/a 
Percent old for grade 
(mean) 
    31.2** 19.5   18.6† 13.5   25.3* 14.4 17.4 17.7 13.8 17.6 
Percent non-English 
household (mean) 
  8.7   6.1 10.8   7.8   6.9   9.4   9.3 11.4   6.7 14.0 
Percent with three or 
more moves in 
elementary school 
(mean) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 28.6 21.5 
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
a Student test scores, attendance, mobility, language and age data for JHS 142 Stranahan are not available.  




School year 2003-4 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 
Characteristics Closed: last 
year is 2005-6 
All other MS Closed: last 
year is 2006-
7 






year is 2008-9 
All other 
MS 
 (n=13) (n=149) (n=5) (n=169) (n=5) (n=142) (n=5) (n=149) 
Enrollment (mean) 728† 1075 934 908 589 1133 655 777 
Racial composition (mean)         
Percent American Indian   0.5   0.4   0.7   0.5   0.9   0.6   0.6   0.6 
Percent Asian    3.6   7.4   0.8   5.0   1.7   6.2   0.9   5.8 
Percent Black 49.4 40.3 58.8 43.2 61.4 49.2 64.6 47.8 
Percent Hispanic 45.1 44.8 39.0 45.3 33.4 39.6 33.2 39.9 
Percent White         1.5***   7.0   0.7   6.0   2.6   4.5   0.7   5.9 
Percent eligible for 
free/reduced lunch 
(mean) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
89.0 79.9 88.1 88.1 
Percent old for grade (mean)     20.2** 15.2    24.7** 16.2    22.7** 15.1   20.5† 15.3 
Percent non-English 
household (mean) 
15.6 15.5 13.8 17.0 11.3 15.7 12.6 16.0 
Percent with three or more 
moves in elementary 
school (mean) 
  30.4† 25.1 33.4† 26.4    35.9** 26.0 29.5 25.9 




  As discussed earlier in this chapter, school-average academic characteristics during 
phase-out remained relatively constant, suggesting perhaps that the students who chose to leave 
schools during the phase-out process were not much different than students who elected to stay, 
and further, that the experience of phasing out did not impact students.  My examination of 
student-level characteristics suggests, however, some differences across students who 
experienced phase-out and students who moved prior to phase-out (see Table 4-7).6  
Although students in both groups had extremely low test scores, close to -0.5 SD on 
average, students who left during phase-out had slightly higher average test scores across all 
grades, compared to students who remained in the closing schools.  The gap was approximately 
the same size across grades, and was apparent both prior to entering middle school as well as 
during middle school.  In contrast, however, these students who left had higher rates of absences 
and tardies than students who stayed, and these differences in the number of absences and tardies 
grew wider in later grades.  For example, the average fall semester absence rate for sixth-grade 
students who remained was about one day less than students who left.  By eighth grade, the 
average fall semester absence rate for eighth-grade was about three days lower, on average.  
Furthermore, although not displayed in this table, the comparatively stronger academic 
characteristics of school movers was not reflective of trends in the district population as a whole; 
across all middle schools, students who moved schools rather than remain tended to have lower 
state test scores and higher rates of absences and tardies.  Finally, regarding demographic 
characteristics, movers and stayers appear similar, with one exception: students who stayed 
enrolled in the phasing-out school were less likely to Black and more likely to be Hispanic. 
                                                 
6 In the remained group I include students who were in the school at the time of announcement in grade five, six 
and seven and never moved, meaning if they were in grade seven they experienced one year of phase-out. If they 
were in grade six, two years. In the moved group, I include students who were in the school at the time of 
announcement in grade five, six and seven and ever moved – in the first or second year of phase-out. As such, some 
of these students (the fifth and sixth graders) may have experienced one year of phase out. 
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 Table 4-7  
Characteristics of Students Who Leave and Stay during Phase-Out 
 Remained Moved  Remained Moved 
ELA scores a (mean)   Days tardy (mean)   
Grade 4 -.431     -.459 Grade 4 Fall  5.2***  6.6 
Grade 5 -.418*** -.479 Grade 4 Spring  4.9***  6.3 
Grade 6 -.445*** -.526 Grade 5 Fall  5.1***  6.7 
Grade 7 -.475*     -.516 Grade 5 Spring  5.4***  6.9 
Grade 8 -.462*   -.496 Grade 6 Fall  6.5***  7.5 
Math scoresa(mean)   Grade 6 Spring  9.0**  9.8 
Grade 4 -.381*** -.447 Grade 7 Fall  9.8*** 10.8 
Grade 5 -.390*** -.479 Grade 7 Spring 12.5 12.6 
Grade 6 -.455*** -.551 Grade 8 Fall 11.7*** 10.7 
Grade 7 -.479*** -.577 Grade 8 Spring 12.7** 13.6 
Grade 8 -.492*** -.565 Race/ethnicity (%)***   
Days absent (mean)   American Indian   .5%   .6% 
Grade 4 Fall  6.1***   7.0 Asian   3.3%  2.8% 
Grade 4 Spring  7.3***   8.4 Black 43.8% 50.4% 
Grade 5 Fall  5.8***   6.8 Hispanic 49.8% 43.9% 
Grade 5 Spring  7.7***   8.8 White  2.4%  1.8% 
   Multiracial, other   .2%   .5% 
Grade 6 Fall  6.5***   8.2 Eligible for free/reduced lunch(%) 34.0% 31.4% 
Grade 6 Spring  8.7***  11.2 Old for grade (%) 20.7%* 22.2% 
Grade 7 Fall  7.5***  10.7 Non-English household (%) 14.5% 14.9% 
Grade 7 Spring  9.8***  13.6 Number of elementary schools 
(mean) 
1.93***  2.21 
Grade 8 Fall  8.1***  10.9 Special education (%) 10.8% 10.8% 
Grade 8 Spring 10.9***  15.0    
†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
a Measure is z-scored (M=0; SD=1. 108
 One argument against closure contends that during phase-out and after closure, nearby 
schools that may already be overburdened receive an influx of students due to the closure.  Table 
4-8 displays the number of students transferring from phasing-out schools into other receiving 
schools.  Students who moved during phase-out moved to a number of schools; most years 
schools received a mean of less than five students overall, although from 2002 to 2004, the influx 
of students received was between 15 and 20 students on average.  However, the number of 
students enrolled varied widely, as the large standard deviations suggest.  As displayed in Figure 
4-1 most schools received fewer than 25 students per year.  However, during 2002 through 2005, 
a few schools received more than 50, and in a couple of cases, close to 200 students in one year.   




Number of schools 
phasing out in the 





of PO students 
received 
Maximum number 
of PO students 
received 
Mean number of 
PO students 
received SD 
1998 4 38 1 4 1.37   .7 
1999 11 124 1 20 3.20  3.5 
2000 16 120 1 32 2.30  3.2 
2001 9 105 1 30 2.57  3.9 
2002 5 97 1 175 7.47 20.5
2003 4 55 1 87 6.00 14.9
2004 14 169 1 158 4.03 15.2
2005 15 181 1 54 2.51  4.4 
2006 10 152 1 34 2.30  4.1 
2007 13 154 1 22 1.97  2.5 
2008 8a 42 1 6 1.26   .9 
 a Data on phase-out status are available only for schools in the second year of phase-out; thus excluded from 2008 












 Phase-Out Process: Discussion 
The gradual nature of New York City's closure process may allow for increased 
personal attention to students as the schools get smaller, which in turn may serve to 
minimize student mobility.  On the other hand, the stigma associated with closure and the 
extended nature of the phase-out process might result in greater student mobility.  Critics 
of closure also argue that schools lose important academic resources during phase-out as 
they grow smaller and prepare to close. 
 The variability in mobility rates across years during phase-out suggests that 
changing District policies may play a role in determining mobility rates during phase-out, 
particularly given that the differences align with changes in District administrations.  
Anecdotal reports suggest that nearby schools often receive an influx of higher-need 
students when a neighboring school is phasing out and closed.  My analysis suggests that 
in a few cases in certain years, a few schools were burdened by the enrollment of 50-200 
students moving from closing schools, but that in most years, schools enrolled very few 
students fleeing the phase-out process.  Thus, phasing schools out rather than closing 
schools immediately, an approach often taken by other large districts such as Chicago, 
appears to lessen the impact on neighboring schools. 
Students who move during phase-out had slightly higher test scores on average, 
compared to students who stayed.  In contrast, movers had higher rates of absences and 
tardies than students who remained.  The differential findings between the test scores 
trends and attendance trends are puzzling.  The test score differences might partially be 
an artifact of the state tests, which are not necessarily optimal instruments to measure 
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 achievement for students that are already performing quite low.  For example, by 
definition mean reversion is more pronounced among low-performing students.  
This chapter’s findings also provide some direction for my second research 
question on the impact of closure.  The trends are suggestive, particularly the fact that 
students who left school during phase-out ended up at higher-performing schools. But a 
closer analysis of the impact of closure is required.  Analysis of impacts should examine 
effects by year, given the differential rates of mobility across administrations.  Measures 
of the impacts of closure should also take into account the blunt nature of the state test 
scores, by considering potential ceiling or floor effects, and by using other measures of 
academic behavior such as attendance rates.  
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 Chapter 5: Impact of School Closure 
 
My analysis of the impact of closure focuses on middle schools (grades 6-8) 
whose last year of operation was in 2006, 2007 or 2008.  The NYC DOE closed fourteen 
middle schools during this three-year period.  The descriptive results in the prior chapter 
indicate that three years prior to closure, these failing schools served substantially larger 
proportions of academically and socially at-risk students.  It is therefore possible that the 
poor academic performance of schools selected for closure simply reflected the types of 
students they served, rather than the contribution these schools made to their students’ 
learning and attendance.  My primary analytic models attempt to disentangle selection 
effects from causal effects, comparing academic growth among students who enrolled in 
sixth grade in schools that would soon be closed to future cohorts of students who would 
have enrolled in the closed schools had they not been closed. 
Difference-in-Differences Analyses 
Table 5-1 presents my findings regarding the impact of enrolling in a chronically 
failing school on student academic development in ELA and mathematics, based on my 
matching, difference-in-differences analyses.  All estimates are fully adjusted for the 
available student-level covariates.  As indicated by the intercept for each model, students 
in both groups entered middle school at a considerable academic disadvantage compared 
to students who did not attend, or were not predicted to have attended, a school slated for 
closure.  Reflecting the school-level findings from the previous chapter, average students’ 
fifth grade ELA and mathematics test scores were roughly one-third to one-half standard 
deviation below the New York City average during each time period. 
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 As the grade by to-be-closed-school interaction term coefficients indicate, within 
each cohort and subject, students who enrolled in chronically underperforming schools 
learned slightly less over the course of their middle school careers compared to students 
who attended alternate receiving schools.  These negative effects varied by grade and by 
cohort.  School-closure estimates indicate negative effects in seventh grade associated 
with enrollment at a to-be-closed school, but not in other grades.  There were two 
exceptions to these patterns: I found no differences in ELA test scores for students who 
enrolled in schools closed in 2007 compared to their counterparts who attended other 
schools, although negative effects in mathematics were evident for students who enrolled 
in schools closed this year.  I also found no differences in math test scores for students 
who enrolled in schools closed in 2006, although in contrast, I found negative effects on 





Impact of Enrolling in a School Identified for Closure on ELA and Mathematics Learning 
 
 ELA Mathematics
2006 (n=5,242)   
Intercept -0.457* -0.510* 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Enrolled in a to-be-closed school -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.025) (0.026) 
Sixth grade  0.016  0.017 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Sixth grade* to-be-closed school -0.104* -0.015 
 (0.031) (0.033) 
Seventh grade  0.087*  0.037* 
 (0.013) (0.014) 
Seventh grade* to-be-closed school -0.056* -0.029 
 (0.018) (0.020) 
Eighth grade -0.006 -0.028 
 (0.015) (0.017) 
Eighth grade* to-be-closed school -0.018 -0.038 
 (0.019) (0.022) 
2007 (n=1,974)   
Intercept -0.409* -0.389* 
 (0.046) 0.044 
Enrolled in a to-be-closed school  0.005 0.003 
 (0.042) (0.041) 
Sixth grade  0.082 0.051 
 (0.054) (0.047) 
Sixth grade* to-be-closed school -0.019 0.093 
 (0.060) (0.051) 
Seventh grade  0.057* 0.072* 
 (0.026) (0.025) 
Seventh grade* to-be-closed school -0.043 -0.093* 
 (0.037) (0.031) 
Eighth grade  0.068 0.007 
 (0.037) (0.032) 
Eighth grade* to-be-closed school -0.080 -0.058 
 (0.046) (0.036) 






2008(n=3,890)   
Intercept -0.413* -0.479* 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
Enrolled in a to-be-closed school -0.048  0.020 
 (0.028) (0.032) 
Sixth grade  0.066  0.041 
 (0.030) (0.022) 
Sixth grade* to-be-closed school -0.003  0.042 
 (0.033) (0.039) 
Seventh grade  0.076* 0.117* 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
Seventh grade* to-be-closed school -0.123* -0.142* 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Eighth grade  0.025 -0.049 
 (0.024) (0.025) 
Eighth grade* to-be-closed school  0.012  0.041 
 (0.029) (0.030) 
*p<.05 
 
With ELA, in schools closed in 2006 and 2008, children attending failing schools 
gained somewhat less in seventh grade (ES=-0.06 and -0.12, respectively), but had 
parallel growth rates in sixth and eighth grades compared to similar students who 
attended alternate schools.  No effects were found for the 2007 cohort in ELA.  Similarly, 
with mathematics, differences between failing and alternate schools also vary by grade 
and cohort.  With both the 2007 and 2008 cohorts, students attending schools that would 
soon be closed gained slightly less in mathematics in seventh grade (ES=-0.09 and -0.14, 
respectively), while no effects were found for the 2006 cohort.  Importantly, however, 
note that across all cohorts, subjects, and grades, students attending both the closed and 
alternate schools scored well below other New York City students.  Figures 5-1 to 5-3 
provide graphic displays of the estimated effects of closure by the time students reach 
eighth grade, organized by subject, based on the models displayed in Table 4-1.  The y-
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 axis indicates achievement levels in standard deviation units compared to all students in 
New York City in a given year, grade, and subject. 
 
Figure 5-1. Closure: ELA exam. 
 
 


























































 In addition to examining student test score trajectories, I also examined the impact 
of school closure on student absences.  I include absences as a second academic outcome 
in part as a robustness check on test scores, because absences are less likely to have 
measurement error and mean reversion.  Second, absences themselves are an important 
indicator of student achievement—being absent from school is associated with a decrease 
in learning and achievement, lower exam scores, higher rates of dropping out, drug and 
alcohol use and unemployment (Gottfried, 2009).  
Table 5-2 presents my findings regarding the impact of enrolling in a chronically 
failing school on student absences (log transformed).  All estimates are fully adjusted for 
the available student-level covariates.  Students in both groups have an average of 
between 2.4 to 2.5 logged absences (11 to just under 13 absences) in the year prior to 
entering middle school, as indicated by the intercept in each of the three cohort models.  
The grade by to-be-closed-school interaction term coefficients indicate that within 
each cohort and subject, students who enrolled in chronically underperforming schools 
have higher rates of absences over the course of their middle school careers compared to 
students who attended alternate receiving schools.  These negative effects varied by grade 
and by cohort.  All students in both treatment and control have higher absences in eighth 
grade.  Four of the nine school-closure estimates—three cohorts, three grades per 




 Table 5-2 
Impact of Attending a School Identified for Closure on Logged Absences 
 
 Absences (logged) 
2006 (n=5,242)  
Intercept  2.546*
 (0.026)




Sixth grade* to-be-closed school  0.011
 (0.043)
Seventh grade  0.032
 (0.019)
Seventh grade* to-be-closed school  0.067*
 (0.022)
Eighth grade  0.166*
 (0.015)
Eighth grade* to-be-closed school -0.012
 (0.020)
2007 (n=1,974)  
Intercept  2.529*
 (0.046)




Sixth grade* to-be-closed school  0.040
 (0.060)
Seventh grade  0.033
 (0.023)
Seventh grade* to-be-closed school  0.078*
 (0.033)
Eighth grade  0.118*
 (0.024)





  Absences (logged) 
2008 (n=3,890)  
Intercept  2.410*
 (0.036)
Enrolled in a to-be-closed school -0.062
 (0.034)
Sixth grade  0.023
 (0.039)
Sixth grade* to-be-closed school  0.015
 (0.045)
Seventh grade  0.021
 (0.022)
Seventh grade* to-be-closed school  0.087*
 (0.028)
Eighth grade  0.097*
 (0.025)




Figure 5-3 provides graphic displays of the fitted estimates in Table 5-2, 
organized by year of closure.  The y-axis indicates number of days absent per year in a 
given grade (in the non-logged, days metric).  For schools closed in 2006 and 2008, 
children attending chronically underperforming schools had higher rates of absences in 
seventh grade (0.07 and 0.09 logged absences, respectively, a little over one day higher), 
but parallel rates in sixth and eighth grades compared to similar students who attended 
alternate schools.  For schools closed in 2007, students attending schools that would later 
be closed had higher rates of absences in seventh and eighth grade (0.08 and 0.09 logged 
absences, respectively), and parallel rates of absences in sixth grade compared to their 
counterparts in alternate schools.  It is interesting to note, across all academic outcomes, 




Figure 5-3. 2006 Closure: Absences.  
 
Difference-in-Differences Discussion 
 The middle schools New York City closed during the mid-2000s for poor 
performance did indeed have very weak student test scores, and were isolated both 
economically and racially/ethnically.  The findings from my primary analytic models 
suggest that closing these schools had small positive effects on student learning and 
absenteeism.  Students who attended chronically underperforming middle schools had 
lower ELA and mathematics gains and higher rates of absences compared to students 
who would have enrolled in the same school had it not closed.  With two exceptions, this 
finding is consistent across all three years of closure, although the effects vary by grade, 
cohort and subject.  
 These findings must be considered in light of a few limitations.  The analyses are 


















 and control groups along a number of student characteristics, it is possible that the 
analyses remain biased by unobserved confounding characteristics that are related to both 
the treatment assignment and student academic growth.  However, by accounting for 
student's elementary school in the matching process—in addition to multiple years of test 
score and attendance data—the models are relatively robust, given that the factors that 
influence elementary school choice are likely to be quite similar to the factors that 
influence middle school enrollment choices (and arguably student academic 
development).  
 Additionally, although the models may suffer bias stemming from the use two 
separate time periods, I was not able to control for any year effects.  Specifically, it is 
possible that the district implemented an initiative that affected only students attending 
low-performing schools during one cohort’s middle school years and not during the 
comparison cohort school years.  However, the consistent nature of my findings across all 
three years of closure—and the fact that across years of closure the control and treatment 
groups share some common school years—provides some degree of confidence about my 
findings.  
Robustness Check: Fixed-Effects Analyses 
As a robustness check on these results and to address the potential biases 
discussed above, I use student fixed-effects models to examine the impact of closure, an 
approach that allows me to hold constant implicitly both observed and unobserved time-
invariant student characteristics.  This second approach also allows me to control for year 
effects, a second potential bias in my primary models.  This analysis is slightly different 
than the above difference-in-differences model. First, it measures the impact of attending 
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 a chronically failing school compared to the counterfactual of attending any other current 
alternative receiving school. Second, it examines the impact of attending a to-be-closed 
school at any point during middle school, rather than simply enrolling in a to-be-closed 
school in sixth grade.  
 Table 5-3 summarizes the within-student results for ELA and mathematics 
learning, which describe the impact of attending a chronically underperforming school.  
My results suggest a small negative impact of attending a to-be-closed school on both 
ELA and mathematics learning, and further, that the negative impact increases very 
slightly by length of time enrolled in a chronically underperforming to-be-closed school, 
as indicated by the closure prior exposure measure and exposure-by-attendance-at-a-
closed-school interaction coefficients.  On average, the effect of attending a closed 
schools is -0.03 SD, and this effect decreases by -0.08 SD for each year enrolled in a 
closed school. Results for mathematics are of the same magnitude. 
Table 5-3  
Within-Student Estimates of Attending a School Identified for Closure on ELA and Mathematics 
Learning (n= 9,591 students) 
 ELA Mathematics
   
Intercept -0.543*** -0.535***
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Enrolled in a to-be-closed school -0.080*** -0.080***
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Exposure to to-be-closed school(number of prior years 
enrolled in to-be-closed school) -0.083** -0.081***
 (0.022) (0.020) 
Enrolled in*exposure to to-be-closed school  0.054*  0.051** 
 (0.019) (0.016) 
Sixth grade  0.039**  0.050***
 (0.013) (0.010) 
Seventh grade  0.055*  0.056** 
 (0.020) (0.016) 
Eighth grade  0.093**  0.064* 
 (0.027) (0.025) 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Observations are annual.
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 Figures 5-4 and 5-5 provide graphic displays of the estimates in Table 5-3, 
organized by subject.  To simplify the presentation, the predictions assume that the one 
year of exposure to a closed school occurred in 6th grade rather than 7th or 8th grade, and 
that the two years of exposure occurred in 6th and 7th grade.  The y-axis indicates 
achievement levels in standard deviation units.  For both ELA and mathematics, the 
models predict an average gap of .17 SD by eighth grade between students who had not 
enrolled in a chronically underperforming school and students who attended a chronically 
underperforming school all three years of middle school. With only attending sixth grade 
at a to-be-closed school, we would predict a slightly smaller ELA and mathematics test 
score gap in eighth grade of .11 SD.   I also examine impact of closure on student 
attendance rates, and find no impact of attending a chronically underperforming school 
on rates of student absences (See Table 5-4). 
 






























Figure 5-5. Predicted mathematics test scores by years of exposure to a to-be-closed 
school.   
 
Table 5-4  
Within-Student Estimates of Attending a School Identified for Closure on Absences 





Intercept  2.661*** 
 (0.007) 
Enrolled in a to-be-closed school -0.027 
 (0.014) 
Exposure to to-be-closed school(number of prior years enrolled in 
to-be-closed school)  0.002 
 (0.020) 
Enrolled in*exposure to to-be-closed school  0.009 
 (0.017) 
Sixth grade  0.065*** 
 (0.011) 
Seventh grade  0.178*** 
 (0.017) 
Eighth grade  0.326*** 
 (0.025) 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Observations are annual.
 
Fixed-Effects Discussion 
 My fixed-effects results suggest a small, negative impact of attending a 

































 scores within individual students.  Students who attended chronically underperforming 
middle schools learned less than they would have had they attended other alternative 
schools.  The magnitude of the impact of closure on student test scores using a fixed-
effect approach is strikingly similar to the magnitude of the findings using the matching 
difference-in-differences model, despite the slightly different populations and treatment 
of interest.  The consistency of the results across the two models provide some additional 
confidence in the conclusion that the impact of closure on student learning is positive but 
quite small.  
 I did not find any impact on rates of student absences, a finding in contrast to that 
of my primary analyses using a difference-in-differences approach, in which attending a 
to-be-closed school appeared to increase student rates of absences.  This discrepancy is 
likely in part due to the fact that the fixed-effects findings pertain only to the already 
more mobile students—those who switch schools during middle school—who are also 
likely to have high rates of absences, perhaps regardless of what school they attend.  
Nonetheless, the lack of impact of closure on attendance rates in this second model 
suggest that further research is needed on other student outcomes beyond test scores.   
 Additionally, one shortcoming of this fixed-effect strategy is that it does not 
control for time-varying unobserved characteristics that might change across middle 
school and be related to student learning and attendance outcomes.  For example, 
students may switch middle schools because a sudden change in family income that 
necessitates moving apartments, and a sudden drop in family income is also likely to 
negatively affect student learning and attendance,  negatively biasing the results.  It 
seems possible, however, that students who move in to to-be-closed schools are just as 
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 likely as students who move out of to-be-closed schools to be experiencing these kinds of 
disruptive conditions, a possibility that reduces concerns about this type of bias.  
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 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 Reformers and policy makers often lament the seemingly intractable nature of the 
practice of education—what Tyack and Cuban (1995) term the "grammar of schooling."  
Despite advances in knowledge and technology, instruction and the organization of 
schools have not followed pace.  This would not be so troubling were all schools of 
equally high quality. Unfortunately, the schools least likely to change often are those who 
most need to change, and that serve the most disadvantaged clientele.  Arne Duncan's 
comments on the new federal School Improvement Grant program typify this 
perspective: "For too long, educators have tinkered around the edges in low-performing 
schools, consigning generations of students of color to receiving an inferior education.  
It’s time to transform chronically low-performing schools.  It’s time to put an end to the 
tireless tinkering" (USDOE Press Office, 2012).   
 An increasingly popular response to such calls for bolder, more dramatic 
education reform is the closure of chronically failing schools.  School closures in several 
cities, including New York and Chicago, have accelerated over the last few years, partly 
in response to federal and state policies designed to foster this acceleration.  The focus on 
closing schools rather than attempting to transform struggling schools represents a shift 
from a "schools" approach to a broader and more systemic notion of education reform, 
one that essentially gives up on the lowest-performing schools for the greater good of the 
system as a whole.   
 Despite the increased use of school closures as a reform, very little research has 
examined the effect of closure on student outcomes.  This dissertation is an attempt to fill 
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 this gap in the literature by examining the implementation of school closure in New York 
City over the past decade and its impact on students.   
Summary of Findings 
 In my first results chapter, I describe the types of schools that New York City 
selects for closure.  I find that schools that are closed evidence significantly lower school-
average state test score exams and lower attendance rates compared to other middle 
schools, usually for several years prior to closure. The little variation that exists appears 
to be explained by the closing of a school for fiscal considerations rather than 
accountability purposes.  They also tend to experience a small drop in enrollment prior to 
selection to closure.  Moreover, in many ways the closed schools mirror the stereotypes 
of urban failing schools—students who attend these schools are almost exclusively 
Hispanic and Black, they are more likely to come from low-income families, and are 
more mobile than other middle schools students in the district.  They are less likely, 
however, to come from non-English-speaking households.  I also find that the students 
who enroll in these chronically under-performing middle schools do so already at a 
significant academic disadvantage; prior to enrolling in the to-be-closed middle schools, 
entering students have significantly lower test scores and higher rates of absences and 
tardies than students in other middle schools.  Additionally, school-average test scores 
and absences of entering students appear to drop slightly just prior to a schools' selection 
for closure.  These findings suggest that in part, closed schools perform poorly because 
their entering students are some of the most vulnerable and high-needs students in the 
District. 
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  I also examine characteristics of the reconstituted schools that replace the closed 
schools, and find that reconstituted schools enroll higher performing students with fewer 
absences and tardies in the year prior to enrolling, compared to students who enroll in the 
schools that are later closed.  However, with few exceptions, reconstituted schools appear 
to be serving similar types of students to those served by the closed schools in terms of 
race/ethnicity and home language, mobility and eligibility for free/reduced lunch. This 
finding provides some evidence that the district was not particularly successful in altering 
the concentrations of poor students within the schools, one of the stated goals of the 
policy. In contrast, the reconstituted schools tend to be less academically segregated than 
their closed counterparts.  
 In the second results chapter, I examine the District's implementation of the 
phase-out process, focusing on student mobility in the two years prior to closure.  I find 
some small variation across District administrations in student mobility. Specifically, 
schools phased-out prior to 2002 tend to have slightly higher rates of mobility, while 
mobility in schools phasing-out after this year are similar to other District schools that are 
not phasing-out.  Additionally, with the exception of two school years, my analysis 
suggests neighboring schools are not burdened by the enrollment of high numbers of 
students fleeing the phase-out process.  Students that do elect to leave the schools during 
phase-out tend to have slightly higher test scores than those who stay, but higher rates of 
absences and tardiness.  
 In the third results chapter, I examine the impact of closure on student outcomes 
using a matching difference-in-differences approach, comparing student test scores and 
rates of absences between students who attended to-be-closed schools with students who 
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 would have attended the schools had they not closed.  I focus this analysis across three 
cohorts of schools that were closed in 2006, 2007 and 2008.  I find across all three 
cohorts a small, positive effect of school closure on student test scores.  Students who 
attended chronically underperforming middle schools had lower ELA and mathematics 
gains compared to students who would have enrolled in the same school had it not closed.  
Similarly, I find a small positive effect of closure on student absences: students who 
attend to-be-closed schools have slightly higher rates of absences compared to their 
counterparts who attended alternate schools.   
 Finally, as a robustness check for the results obtained via the matching, 
difference-in-differences models, I employ a second set of analyses to examine the 
impact of closure. Specifically, I use a student fixed-effects approach to compare student 
test-score and attendance trajectories within individuals before and during middle school.  
The results of these models are similar to those produced by my main models: students 
learn slightly less at chronically underperforming schools, compared to what would have 
happened had they attended an alternate school.  However, in contrast to my difference-
in-differences model results, I did not find an effect on student absences. This differential 
finding warrants further study, but is possibly attributable to the fact that the fixed-effects 
results pertain only to mobile students—those who move middle schools during the 
middle grades.  
Limitations 
External Validity and Generalizability  
 There are a number of limitations to my findings, some of which relate to the 
extent to which the results can be generalized to other contexts.  The data are from one 
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 city that arguably is an anomalous and unique context.  New York City is the largest 
school district in the U.S., and its sheer size, number of schools and perhaps most 
importantly, density of schools might prevent generalizing these findings to other urban 
contexts.  Because schools are so geographically close, school closure in New York City 
might be less disruptive to students than in other areas. The labor market in New York is 
also somewhat unique in its size and relatively high level of education, meaning that 
reconstituted schools may have an easier time hiring replacement teachers than 
reconstituted schools in other, less populous urban areas.  For example, while 
implementing school turnarounds under the SIG program, Prince George's County Public 
Schools, a diverse Maryland district in suburban Washington, D.C., was forced to 
abandon closure and reconstitution and use a school reform option that did not require 
replacing the staff because of severe difficulties in hiring new teachers.  Not 
unexpectedly, rural areas also have faced difficulties in re-staffing schools under the SIG 
program (Scott et al., 2012). 
A second potential limitation related to the generalizability of my findings is the 
small number of closed schools I include in the impact study.  Having so few schools in 
the study sample provides us with less certainty of whether the closed schools are 
representative of the future population of closed schools in the District to which we 
would like to generalize the findings, much less school closures outside of the District. 
And even if this small sample of schools closed are representative of closed middle 
schools more widely, the small sample size hinders the detection of statistical 
significance. However, this small sample-size problem is difficult to avoid given that the 
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 phenomenon—closing schools—is not a common occurrence in any given year among 
schools with these particular grade spans.  
 A third concern regarding the external validity of my results is related to the 
sample of my primary analysis, the matched students.  The difference-in-difference 
analysis focuses on examining the impact of closure for a unique population of students, 
those who attend closed schools or would have done so.  Extrapolating these findings to 
other students in other districts requires assuming that attendance patterns at schools later 
slated for closure are similar to those in New York City. Additionally, the lack of 
variability in student outcomes in closed schools and their matched sample complicates 
the detection of effects.   
Questions for Future Research  
 My findings provide some preliminary evidence about the impact of closure, but 
do not go far enough in examining the second phase of closure; reconstitution.  
Specifically, my research examines students outcomes across all control scenarios, 
regardless of the type of school in which the control students enrolled.  Further research 
is needed to examine whether the treatment effect of attending a chronically failing 
school differs based on the counterfactual state—that is, whether the effect of closure 
differs by whether a control student attended the reconstituted school versus another 
neighboring middle school.  This is a particularly important question to examine given 
that reconstitution is the counterpart to school closure, and the findings in Chicago that 
effects varied by the type of school students moved to following closure.  
 Another question is whether the findings vary by school characteristics, such as 
student body and staff composition and size of the alternate school and whether the 
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 reconstituted school is a wall-to-wall middle school, a small school sharing a space with 
multiple schools, or has a particular program of focus.  Additionally, it seems likely that 
the effects of the treatment might differ for different types of students.  For example, 
relatively higher-performing students might perform just as well in either condition, 
while the lowest-performing students might be more responsive to different types of 
support and thus experience greater gains following school closure. 
 Additionally, my primary analyses focused on the impact of enrolling in a closed 
school regardless of whether the students remained for the full three years of middle 
school.  Although measuring the impact of enrollment is an important first step because it 
allows me to account for any impacts of attending a failing school on mobility and 
potential negative effects on student learning, I may have underestimated the effect of 
attending the closed school. My analyses average effects across students who leave the 
to-be-closed schools after the first or second year and those who remain at the to-be-
closed school for all three years.  Future research should examine treatment dosage and 
tease out the impact of attending a closed school over one, two or three years compared 
to attendance at alternate middle schools. 
 My primary examination of impacts is limited to outcomes following the first few 
years of closure, in which the reconstituted schools are still quite young.  Future research 
should examine student outcomes as the reconstituted schools develop, as some research 
on the establishment of new schools suggests that these schools have higher impacts after 
the first few years of establishment (Bloom & Unterman, 2012).  
 Additionally, my dissertation focuses on the impact of school closure on students 
who would have attended the closed school—a logical next step would be to focus on 
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 reconstitution and specifically, on all students who attend reconstituted schools, not just 
those who would have attended the closed schools.  Another treatment group of interest is 
the students who would have attended the existing neighboring schools regardless of 
school closure. De la Torre and Gwynne (2009) note that Chicago schools that 
accommodate an influx of students from closed schools, most of whom are low-
achieving, are stretched to such an extent that they are unable to provide the same level of 
prior services. That study’s descriptive analyses indicate that these displaced students end 
up moving to a small handful of schools that tend to be in close proximity to the closed 
schools, despite the fact that students had the option to enroll in any school with available 
space. My description of the phase-out process suggests that patterns in New York City 
might be different than in Chicago, but it seems important to examine the impact of the 
school closure policy not just on students who would have attended the closed school had 
it not been closed or who attend the newly reconstituted school, but on the students who 
attend the neighboring receiving schools after the school closes. If these receiving 
schools experience an influx of low-performing students, they may struggle to maintain 
the existing quality of instruction, in which case we might expect student achievement to 
remain constant or to decrease in comparison to the achievement levels that might have 
resulted with attendance at the chronically failing schools. 
 Finally, future research needs to examine the benefits and costs of closure for 
teachers and neighborhoods where closure occurs. The District administration rests its 
main argument for closure on the presumed benefits for students, leaving the impression 
that any negative implications of closure for teachers and neighborhoods, such as 
decreased neighborhood social capital, are problems that should not be factored in when 
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 examining costs and benefits of school closure. However, the relatively minor benefits of 
closure for students that potentially can be achieved through other less disruptive reforms 
call for a closer examination of the potentially large costs of closure for other non-student 
stakeholders.  
Implications 
 Despite these limitations, my findings suggest some implications for policy. 
Specifically, school closure appears to be a somewhat effective policy to improve student 
academic outcomes. It is not clear, however, whether the policy is efficient. That is, it is 
important to note that the gains of students who attend alternate schools are only slightly 
larger than the gains of students attending schools slated to be closed—less than 0.2 SD 
over three years. For comparison, a meta-analysis of comprehensive school reform 
suggests that these types of reforms result in effects of .16 SD on average (Borman et al. 
2003).  In contrast, meta-analyses of reforms that target specific instructional practices in 
middle and high school appear to be slightly larger, although variable depending on the 
focus.  While curricula program effects were small with average effect sizes of .10 SD in 
mathematics,  programs that focused on instructional methods using extensive 
professional development resulted in significantly larger effects, with a median of 0.34 
SD in mathematics and .021 in literacy (Slavin, Lake & Groff, 2008). And recent 
research on school turnaround models that replace leadership but not the full staff, or that 
replace leadership and some staff but not students—both potentially less politically-
fraught policy alternatives to closure, for example—finds effects to be of similar 
magnitude as my findings on the impact of closure (de la Torre et al., 2012).  Given the 
significant amount of resources expended by the District as it pushes ahead for closures 
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 and by school and community members as they oppose school closures, the potential 
negative effects of closure on teachers and neighborhoods, the acrimonious public 
debates that have in some years been accompanied by lawsuits, and the substantial efforts 
required to close a school and open new ones, the cost of school closures may be too high 
in light of the small effects suggested here.  More research is needed, therefore, that 
compares impacts of closure to other types of contemporary school turnaround reforms 
that are less divisive and disruptive to local communities and families, and to the staff 
that work in schools that are closed.  And to fully understand the implications of closure, 
future research is required to identify the fiscal costs associated with closure, compared to 
the costs of other policies with effects that are of comparable size. 
 The central finding from my dissertation provides a small step forward in sorting 
out the rival theories that support or rebut the argument for the use of school closure.  
Specifically, the small positive effect of school closure suggests that human capital 
theory cannot be outright rejected.  It remains possible that removing ineffective teachers 
is the most effective manner to improve student learning at chronically underperforming 
schools.  However, more evidence is required on the possible detrimental effects of 
school closure, such as whether the teachers at the closed schools are able to be more 
effective in other schools or with other students.  And, as mentioned earlier, research 
comparing the effects of school closure to specific alternative school reform options is 
needed. For example, to understand whether the improvement in student outcomes is due 
to transformations to school-based social capital or human capital reasons would require 
a comparison of school closure effects to less disruptive school turnaround reforms, 
particularly given the similar effect sizes found in the most recent research in Chicago.  
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 Research on the use of more targeted professional development is also required to 
address the question of whether teachers at the chronically underperforming schools are 
truly unable to change their instruction with the right supports.   
 This dissertation also does little to resolve one of the more troubling dilemmas of 
school closure. The District's desire to lessen school segregation conflicts with the 
benefits that family and community social capital might afford students, and is in many 
respects at odds with the school community's desire to ensure that the same students and 
families will be served by their neighborhood school after a school is closed. Perhaps the 
fact that the District has managed to establish reconstituted schools that serve students 
who are similar demographically but less segregated in terms of academic achievement—
arguably the most pernicious type of school segregation—is the best middle ground. 
Closure in Context 
 Closing schools for poor student performance represents a new approach to 
reform. Indeed, it is not school reform per se, but rather, a broader education reform in 
which the targets of reform are educational systems, rather than the processes and 
practices found within individual schools.  One result is that the school-closure approach 
to reform does not prescribe specific methods—it is another in a long line of reforms that 
do not directly address teaching and learning and the processes that encompass classroom 
practice. Rather, similar to many contemporary school reforms, such as those related to 
school choice, decentralization and school governance, charter schools, class and school 
size, use of technology, school funding, principal autonomy and merit pay, school closure 
targets school structures and not instruction. These structural reforms are a means to an 
end—mediating strategies that are only effective in their ability to facilitate or create the 
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 conditions for more effective instruction. They are themselves not able to directly touch 
the work that occurs inside the classroom.   
  Proponents of closure argue that instruction at these chronically underperforming 
schools simply can’t be reformed.  However, there is little evidence that these schools 
have implemented targeted, evidenced-based instructional programs.  Indeed, the New 
York City DOE, despite the scale and number of education reforms implemented over the 
past decade, has been remarkably agnostic on instructional practices and content (O’Day 
& Bitter, 2011).  This agnosticism is likely due in part to the fact that closure and other 
structural reforms are easier to understand, easier to implement and easier to measure 
than the more complicated classroom interactions that take place between students and 
teachers.  However, the District has also purposefully backed away from instituting 
policies to manage instruction in any systemic manner, predicated on the idea that 
autonomy in exchange for increased accountability is the most effective means to 
increase student achievement (O'Day & Bitter, 2011).  While it may be that allowing 
schools the autonomy to select their own instructional approaches has significant benefits 
for some types of schools that are already functioning at some baseline level, these 
chronically underperforming schools may be less likely to benefit from the autonomy that 
this approach to reform is designed to allow.  It also seems likely, given the years of 
languishing on city, state and federal accountability "worst school" lists prior to closure, 
that the problem with these schools is not the lack of incentives to improve.  Moreover, 
with the advent of teacher-value-added policies and techniques, incentives to improve 
student learning are already on the rise. 
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  Rather, before the lowest-performing schools are slated for closure, the District 
should consider taking the shortest route to effecting instructional change by directly 
assessing and targeting capacity at the instructional core, with focused attention to the 
evidence base on how and what to teach. Despite education research's reputation as weak 
and often unsubstantiated, there is in fact a significant amount of research that has 
identified specific instructional practices and content associated with large impacts on 
student learning, even taking into account school conditions and resources.   Even if, as 
some proponents of closure claim, teacher capacity is a fixed attribute, the district can 
focus on increasing capacity of the other elements of instruction by aligning the content 
and delivery of instruction to what we know is effective for student engagement and 
learning.  This type of approach requires a shift in focus from autonomy to one of 
capacity building, which would require sustained support and guidance based on 
knowledge about good instruction to allow for incremental sustainable change.  For 
example, the district’s current recommended middle school mathematics curriculum, 
Glencoe’s Impact Mathematics, has no evidence of effectiveness (Slavin, 2009). One 
initial step could be to require struggling schools to select from curricula that have 
evidence of effectiveness.  And perhaps the newly-introduced classroom observations 
tools, which are connected to what we know about effective instructional practices, are a 
promising method to link instructional practices more tightly to student outcomes—
though it seems more likely that coupling the observations with accountability press may 
not allow for honest appraisals of practice.  Extensive guidance across the District, 
targeting the instructional core, coupled with knowledge about what and how to teach 
that is relevant to the conditions these schools face could serve to improve student 
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 learning before school closure is necessary. Given the relatively small benefits of school 
closure reported in my dissertation and the potentially disruptive nature of the reform, it 
seems prudent that school districts explore alternative avenues for their efforts to improve 
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